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RESUMEN 
 
 
El consejo de administración es el principal órgano de toma de decisiones en las 
empresas españolas. Entre los consejeros que componen el consejo de administración 
cabe destacar a los consejeros dominicales, nombrados por los inversores 
institucionales, considerados los accionistas dominantes más importantes en el contexto 
español. Estos consejeros juegan un papel importante en el gobierno corporativo de las 
empresas en cuyos consejos de administración participan. Así pues, el objetivo del 
presente trabajo es analizar cómo la presencia de los consejeros dominicales en los 
consejos de administración de las empresas españolas influyen sobre el gobierno 
corporativo de las mismas. En particular, estudiamos cómo los consejeros dominicales 
influyen en la remuneración del director ejecutivo (CEO) y en la divulgación de 
información sobre Responsabilidad Social Corporativa (RSC) de las empresas. Para 
ello, consideramos a los consejeros dominicales como un único grupo, además de 
distinguir dentro de este grupo entre consejeros sensibles a la presión y consejeros 
resistentes a la presión, atendiendo a si además de la relación de inversión, mantienen o 
no, respectivamente, una relación comercial con la empresa en cuyo consejo de 
administración participan. Proponemos una relación cuadrática entre la presencia de 
estos consejeros y las variables mencionadas, lo que supone que los consejeros 
dominicales pueden desempeñar dos roles opuestos (control y atrincheramiento), 
dependiendo de su nivel de representatividad en el consejo de administración. Los 
resultados obtenidos evidencian que los consejeros dominicales y los consejeros 
resistentes a la presión (aquellos que sólo mantienen una relación de inversión con la 
empresa) influyen en el gobierno corporativo de la compañía y pueden desarrollar dos 
roles opuestos, dependiendo de su nivel de participación en el consejo de 
administración. Sin embargo, los consejeros sensibles a la presión (aquellos que 
representan a inversores institucionales que mantienen una relación de inversión y 
comercial con la empresa en cuyo consejo participan) no influyen en el gobierno 
corporativo de las empresas españolas. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Board of directores is the main decision-making body in Spanish companies. Among 
the directors who make up the board of directors, it is worth mentioning institutional 
directors, who are are appointed by institutional investors, the most important dominant 
shareholders in the Spanish context. These directors play an important role in corporate 
governance of the companies in whose boards they are involved. Therefore, the aim of 
this research is to analyse how the presence of institutional directors on boards of 
Spanish companies influences their corporate governance. Specifically, we study how 
institutional directors affect CEO compensation and CSR disclosure. To do so, we 
consider instituional directors as a homogenous group. Additionallhy, we also classify 
them into directors who are sensitive or resistant to pressure, according not only to the 
investment relationship of their represented, but also if they mantain or not a 
commercial relationship with the company on whoso board these institutional investors 
are represented. We hypothesise a quadratic relationship between the presence of these 
directors on boards and the variables above mentioned, which means that institutional 
dirctors may play two opposite roles (control and entrenchment), depending on their 
level of representation on the board of directors. The findings evidence that institutional 
directors and pressure-resistant directors (those who represent institutional investors that 
only mantain an investment relationship with the company) influence on the coroprate 
governance of companies and they may perform two opposite roles, depending on their 
level of participation on boar of directors. However, pressure-sensitive directors (those 
who represent institutional investors that maintain both an investment and commercial 
relationship with the company in whose board they participate) do not affect corporate 
governance of Spanish companies. 
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INTRODUCCIÓN 
 
 
En las últimas décadas, el aumento de acciones en manos de los inversores 
institucionales ha adquirido una gran importancia en la estructura accionarial de las 
empresas reemplazando, de este modo, a los inversores individuales (Khan et al., 2005). 
En este sentido, una peculiaridad del nuevo contexto financiero es la aparición de una 
nueva clase de agentes financieros: los inversores institucionales. Así pues, en el 
contexto español los inversores institucionales constituyen un elemento esencial del 
sistema financiero español. En este sentido, el volumen de activos de estos inversores 
era de 9.000 millones de euros en 1990 frente a los 280.000 millones a finales del 2005 
(Rabadán, 2009), lo que su patrimonio representaba, en 2005, un 40% del PIB español 
(Fundación Inverco, 2007). 
 
El hecho que el volumen de paquetes accionariales en manos de los inversores 
institucionales haya aumentado, ha provocado que estos inversores no puedan 
desprenderse de dichos paquetes con facilidad y sin experimentar pérdidas al deshacerse 
de los mismos. Esta situación ha provocado que los inversores institucionales hayan 
abandonado un papel pasivo en el gobierno de las empresas en las que poseen acciones 
(abandonar el accionariado de la empresa en caso de no estar de acuerdo con la gestión 
llevada acabo) y hayan empezado a desempeñar un papel activo en la gestión de las 
mismas, convirtiéndoles como el mecanismo más eficaz para influir en el gobierno 
corporativo de las empresas (Wilcox, 2001). 
 
Así pues, estudios previos ponen de manifiesto la capacidad de estos inversores en 
influir en asuntos empresariales tales como el rendimiento de la empresa (Jiao and Ye, 
2013), el endeudamiento (García-Meca et al., 2013) o las decisiones estratégicas 
(Neubaum and Zahra, 2006), entre otros, evidenciando la importancia que los inversores 
institucionales están adquiriendo en el gobierno corporativo de las empresas (Ferreira y 
Matos, 2008; Gillan y Starks, 2003; Ruiz-Mallorquí y Santana-Martín, 2009; 2011). 
 
La mayor parte de la investigación llevada a cabo se ha centrado en el estudio de los 
inversores institucionales como accionistas, a pesar de la capacidad que estos inversores 
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tienen para nombrar consejeros en los consejos de administración (Boyd, 1994), en 
adelante consejeros dominicales. El principal motivo puede deberse a que la mayor 
parte de trabajos realizados, hasta el momento, se hayan centrado en el contexto 
anglosajón, en el que este tipo de consejeros es menos frecuente. Sin embargo, la 
presencia de los consejeros dominicales en los países europeos, y en especial en España, 
cobra importancia debido a la importante representación que tienen estos consejeros en 
el consejo de administración (Heidrick y struggles, 2011). La baja protección que los 
pequeños inversores tienen en España explica por qué los inversores institucionales 
desempeñan un papel activo e importante en el gobierno de la empresa y en el consejo 
de administración (Faccio y Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999), uno de los órganos más 
importantes en España para controlar al equipo ejecutivo (Gillan, 2006). 
 
Entre los temas que preocupan a los inversores institucionales con respecto a las 
empresas en las que participan cabe destacar las retribuciones de los directivos de las 
mismas (Georgeson, 2013). En este sentido, hay que señalar que pese a la crisis 
económica-financiera mundial, los fraudes financieros y la quiebra de las compañías, las 
retribuciones de los directivos han sido desmesuradas y el aumento de las mismas no ha 
sido acorde con el rendimiento de las compañías. Por tanto, con el fin de evitar unas 
retribuciones excesivas, el Código Unificado de Buen Gobierno Corporativo (CUBG, 
2015) ha realizado recomendaciones tales como mejorar las transparencia respecto a la 
remuneraciones de ejecutivos y directores, o la separación de la comisión de 
nombramientos y retribuciones en dos comisiones diferentes. En esta misma línea, el 
Gobierno Español también ha promulgado diversas leyes con el fin de evitar unas 
remuneraciones exorbitantes. Así pues, dado que el valor de la empresa puede verse 
afectado por las políticas retributivas, éstas han sido ampliamente objeto de estudio por 
parte del ámbito académico. Respecto a cómo los inversores institucionales influyen 
sobre la retribución de los ejecutivos los resultados no son concluyentes. Mientras hay 
autores que evidencian que estos inversores reducen la compensación de los ejecutivos 
y directores (e.g. Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Khan et al., 2005; Ozkan, 2007), otros 
evidencian que estos inversores influyen positivamente en sus retribuciones (e.g. Croci 
et al., 2012; Fernandes et al., 2012). 
 
Por otro lado, el comportamiento de las sociedades, no sólo respecto a sus 
accionistas, sino también respecto a sus grupos de interés (e.g. clientes, proveedores, 
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empleados, etc.), en particular, y respecto a la sociedad y medioambiente, en general, ha 
adquirido una notable importancia en los últimos años. En este sentido, mientras existen 
trabajos que indagan sobre los beneficios que aporta la responsabilidad social 
corporativa (RSC) (e.g. Baron, 2001; Maxwell et al., 2000; Reverte, 2012), otros 
intentan averiguar qué características empresariales promueven un comportamiento 
responsable. En el ámbito institucional, tanto las instituciones europeas como las 
españolas, han promulgado normas para promover un comportamiento más responsable 
por parte de las empresas. En este sentido, el CUBG (2015) también recomienda el 
fomento de una política responsable por parte de las empresas. Respecto a los inversores 
institucionales, los resultados de investigaciones previas no son concluyentes (e.g. 
Arora y Dhawadkar, 2011; Dyck et al., 2015; Fernández-Sánchez et al., 2011), 
evidenciando una relación tanto positiva como negativa entre estos inversores y la RSC. 
 
Así pues, el objetivo de este trabajo es estudiar cómo la presencia de consejeros que 
representan a los inversores institucionales en el principal órgano de decisión de las 
empresas cotizadas españolas, el consejo de administración, influyen sobre las 
decisiones empresariales, en concreto sobre la retribución del director ejecutivo (CEO) 
y la divulgación de información sobre responsabilidad social corporativa. 
 
Para alcanzar este objetivo, en primer lugar analizamos cómo los consejeros 
dominicales, en general, influyen sobre la retribución del director ejecutivo (CEO) y la 
divulgación de la RSC. A continuación, y dado que los inversores institucionales 
engloban un amplio grupo de entidades (bancos, compañías de seguros, fondos de 
inversión, fondos de pensión, etc.), clasificamos a los consejeros dominicales en dos 
grupos, atendiendo a si representan inversores institucionales que mantienen únicamente 
una relación de inversión con la empresa en cuyo consejo de administración participan 
(consejero dominical resistente a la presión), o representan inversores institucionales 
que no sólo mantienen una relación de inversión, sino también una relación comercial 
con la empresa (consejero dominical sensible a la presión). El motivo de esta 
clasificación se debe a que no todos los inversores institucionales pueden tener los 
mismos incentivos en participar en el gobierno de la compañía, y las relaciones 
comerciales son consideradas un elemento clave que puede afectar al control por parte 
de los consejeros dominicales (Brickley et al., 1988). Por último, proponemos que los 
consejeros que representan a los inversores institucionales en el consejo de 
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administración pueden llevar a cabo dos roles opuestos (rol de control/rol de 
atrincheramiento). Para ello, sugerimos que existe una relación no lineal, concretamente 
cuadrática, entre los consejeros dominicales y las decisiones empresariales, y el papel 
que desempeñen estos consejeros, dependerá de su nivel de representatividad en el 
consejo de administración en el que participa. 
 
Para alcanzar el objetivo planteado se ha utilizado una muestra de empresas 
cotizadas españolas. Dado el doble rol que proponemos que puede ser desempeñado por 
los consejeros dominicales en el gobierno corporativo, la metodología utilizada para 
contrastar las hipótesis planteadas es una regresión no lineal. 
 
Este trabajo se estructura en dos capítulos. En el primer capítulo se estudia cómo los 
consejeros dominicales influyen en la remuneración del CEO. En primer lugar, 
analizamos el comportamiento de estos consejeros en la remuneración total del CEO, y 
a continuación, examinamos cómo influyen sobre la estructura de la remuneración del 
primer ejecutivo (remuneración fija y variable). En el segundo capítulo analizamos 
cómo estos consejeros repercuten en la divulgación de la RSC. Para ello, medimos la 
divulgación de la RSC de dos formas distintas: en primer lugar, considerando si las 
empresas cotizadas informan, o no, acerca de RSC y, en segundo lugar, a través de la 
construcción de un índice que considera si la empresa informa sobre distintos aspectos 
sociales, económicos y medioambientales. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the last decades, the increase of share in the hands of institucional investors has 
acquired a great importance in the shareholder structure of the companies replacing, in 
this way, the individual investors (Khan et al., 2005). In this sense, a peculiarity of the 
new financial context is the emergence of a new kind of financial agents: institutional 
investors. Thus, in the Spanish context institutional investors are an essential element of 
the Spanish financial system. So, the assets volume of these investors was 9.000 million 
euros in 1990 compared to 280.000 million at the end of 2005 (Rabadán, 2009), which 
in 2005 represented a total of 40% of Spanish Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Fundación Inverco, 2007). 
 
The fact that the volume of shareholder in hands of institutional investors has 
increased, has caused these investors can not get rid of of such volume easily and 
without experiencing losses. This situation has caused institutional investors to have 
abandoned a passive role in governance of companies in which they own shares 
(abandoning the shareholding of companies if they do not agree with the management 
carried out) and have begun to play an active role in the management of these, making 
them the most effective mechanism to influence on corporate governance of companies 
(Wilcox, 2001). 
 
Thus, previous research displays the ability of these investors to influence on 
business issues such as firm performance (Jiao and Ye, 2013), debt (García-Meca et al., 
2013) or strategic decisons (Neubaum and Zahra, 2006), among others, evidencing the 
importance that institutional investors are acquiring in corporate governance of 
companies (Ferreira y Matos, 2008; Gillan y Starks, 2003; Ruiz-Mallorquí y Santana-
Martín, 2009; 2011). 
 
Most of research carried out has focused on the study of institutional investors as 
shareholders, despite the ability of these investors to appoint directors on boards of 
directors (Boyd, 1994), hereafter institutional directors. The main reason may be that 
most of the studies done has, so far, focused on the Anglo-Saxon context, in which this 
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kind of directors is less common. However, the presence of institutional directors in 
European countries, and especially in Spain, is important because of the important 
representation of these directors on the board of directors (Heidrick and Struggles, 
2011). The low protection that small investors have in Spain explains why institutional 
investors play an active and important role in corporate governance on board of 
directors (Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999), one of the most important 
bodies in Spain to control executive team (Gillan, 2006). 
 
Among the concerns of institutional investors with respect to the companies in which 
they invest, it is worth mentioning the CEO compensation (Georgeson, 2013). In this 
sense, it should be noted that despite the global economic and financial crisis, financial 
fraud and bankruptcy of companies, managers remunerations have been excessives and 
their increases have not been in line with the performance of the companies. Therefore, 
in order to avoid excessive remurenations, the Unified Code of Good Corporate 
Governance (CUBG, 2015) has made recommendations such as improving transparency 
regarding executives and directors compensations, or the separation of appointments 
and remuneration committee in two different committees. In the same line, the Spanish 
Government has also enacted some laws in order to avoid exorbitant compensations. 
Thus, since company value can be affected by remuneration policies, these have been 
widely analysed by researchers. Regarding how institutional investors influence 
executive pay, previous findings are inconclusive. While there are authors who evidence 
that these investors reduce executives and directors compensation (e.g. Hartzell and 
Starkds, 2003; Khan et al., 2005; Ozkan, 2007), others display that these investors have 
a positive influence on their remuneration (e.g. Croci et al., 2012; Fernandes et al., 
2012). 
 
On the other hand, the behavior of companies, not only with respect to their 
shareholder, but also with respect to their stakeholders (e.g. customers, suppliers, 
employees, etc.), in particular, and with respect to society and environment in general, 
has acquired a remarkable importance in the last years. In this sense, while there are 
studies that investigate the benefis of CSR (e.g. Baron, 2001; Maxwell et al., 2000; 
Reverte, 2012), others try to find out what business characteristics promote responsible 
behavior. At the institutional level, both European and Spanish institutions have 
promulgated norms to promote more responsible behavior by companies. In this sense, 
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CUBG (2015) also recommends the promotion of a resonsible policy by companies. As 
for institutional investors, findings of previous research are not conclusive (e.g. Arora y 
Dhawadkar, 2011; Dyck et al., 2015; Fernández-Sánchez et al., 2011), showing a 
positve and negative relationship between these investors and CSR. 
 
Thus, the aim of this paper is, therefore, to study how the presence of directors 
representing institutional investors in the main decision-making body of Spanish listed 
companies, the board of directors, affect business decisions, specially on the chief 
executive officer (CEO) compensation and the disclosure of CSR information. 
 
To achieve this objective, we firstly analyze how institutional directors influence on 
CEO compensation and CSR disclosure. Then, since institutional investors include a 
wide group of entities (banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds, etc.), 
we classify them into two groups, considering whether they represent intitutional 
investors who hold only an investment relaionship with the company on whose board of 
directors they serve (pressure-resistant directors), or they represent institutional 
investors who not only mantain an investment relationship, but also a business 
relationship with the company (pressure-sensitive directors). The reason for this 
classification is that not all institutional investors may have the same incentives to 
participate in company governance, and business relatinships are considered a key 
element that may affect control by institutional directors (Brickley et al., 1988). Finally, 
we propose that directors representing institutional investors on board of directors can 
perform two opposite roles (control role / role of entrenchment). To do this, we suggest 
that there is a non-linear relationship, specifically quadratic, between institutional 
directors and business decisions, and the role played by these directors will depend on 
their level of representation on board of directors in which they participate. 
 
In order to achive the proposed aim, a sample of Spanish listed companies has been 
used. Given the double role we propose that institutional directors can perform in 
corporate governance, the methodology used to contrast the hypotheses posited is a non-
linear regression. 
 
This research is structured in two chapters. The first chapter examines how 
institutional directors affect CEO compensation. First, we analyze the behavior of these 
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directors in the total CEO remuneration and, then, we analyse how they imfluence on 
remuneration structure of CEO (fixed and variable remuneration). In the second chapter, 
we analyse how these directors impact on CSR disclosure. To do this, we measure CSR 
disclosure in two different ways: first, considering wheter listed companies report CSR 
and, secondly, by contructing an index that consider whether company reports on 
diferent social, economic and environmental issues. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
DIRECTORS APPOINTED BY 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND THEIR 
EFFECT ON CEO COMPENSATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we examine the repercussion of institutional directors on Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) compensation (total, fix and variables pay), as well as the 
impact of pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive institutional directors, depending on 
if these directors represent institutional investors who have or not business links with 
the firm where they have invested. We hypothesise a quadratic association between 
institutional, pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive directors and CEO compensation.  
The results find that institutional and pressure-resistant directorship affects CEO total 
pay in a non-linear way (a U-shaped): as the presence of institutional and pressure-
resistant directors on boards augments, supporting the monitoring hypothesis and, 
consequently, they get better corporate governance reducing CEO total compensation, 
but when their presence on boards goes beyond a tinning point, the entrenchment 
hypothesis prevails, enhancing CEO total compensation. Contrary to our expectations, 
pressure-sensitive directors do not impact on CEO total compensation. Regarding 
CEO’s compensation structure (fix and variable), the results find that institutional and 
pressure-resistant directors increase fix compensation and reduce variable pay, while 
pressure-sensitive directors affect neither fix nor variable pay. This evidence suggests 
that institutional directors as a whole cannot be treated as a uniform group. and that 
institutional/pressure-resistant directors on boards might play two opposite roles – a 
monitoring and collusion role with CEO – resulting in lower and higher CEO pay, 
respectively. 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Compensation policy is an internal control mechanism that may improve corporate 
governance in firms as it aligns interests between managers and shareholders, and 
therefore, may mitigate agency costs between them, reduce managers’ discretion and 
link managers’ targets with corporate value (Merino et al., 2009). Effective board 
monitoring should result in directors using the pay process as a means of aligning 
management and shareholder interests (Álvarez and Neira, 2006; Ozkan, 2007). Despite 
being compensation policy and board of directors two different corporate governance 
mechanisms, they may be used as complementary rather than as substitutive. In fact, 
executives, several times, control the board of directors, and consequently, it fails to 
fulfil its role. Thus, board composition is essential to perform good performance, which 
leads to a suitable CEO compensation. 
 
Boards can be considered one of the most relevant corporate governance mechanism 
to restrict managerial discretion, specifically when in their composition there are 
institutional directors appointed by dominant or controlling shareholders (banks and 
insurance companies), since they perform a significant role on boards and in resolving 
issues in corporate governance (Crespí et al., 2004). Placing and supervising the 
company’s policies for compensating management is another function of the board 
(Baixauli-Soler and Sánchez-Marín, 2011), and its features, as the literature argues, can 
be an element impacting on top managers compensation (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003).  
 
The disproportionate pays earned by Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and 
executives, particularly when these high amounts of pays are not sufficiently associated 
to the performance of firms, is a factor that drives the recent attention in CEO pay. 
Extant research has analysed the relationship between the board’s characteristics and 
CEO’s compensation, focusing mainly on board composition, and specifically on 
independent directors (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Ayadi and Boujèlbène, 2013; Petra 
and Dorata, 2008). Nevertheless, previous literature has paid little attention to other 
board members: directors appointed by institutional investors (from now on institutional 
directors), since most previous literature bases principally on the association between 
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institutional shareholding, acting as shareholders, and executive compensation (e.g. 
Cheng and Firth, 2005; Ezzeddine and Lamia, 2006; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
 
Prior research finds that institutional directors have a relevant effect on financial 
reporting quality (Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014), earnings management 
(García-Osma and Gill de Albornoz, 2007), firm value (Kumar and Singh, 2012) and 
leverage (García-Meca et al., 2013). Hence, given the importance of institutional 
directors in allocating capital to firms, as well as their role in company governance, an 
understanding of how their representation on boards might affect CEO pay merits our 
attention. Therefore, our research aims to fill this gap in the literature and to 
demonstrate how it extensively contributes to our knowledge on the repercussion of 
directors appointed by institutional investors on boards on CEO pay. Given CEOs 
power, they can control boards, which can be used by them to improve their interests 
like pay. A firm’s compensation policy is able to influence its value (Gerhart and 
Milkovich, 1990), and the main difficulty in the boardroom is between the CEO and the 
directors, as the CEO has incentives to influence the board to remain in the post and 
increase his or her benefits (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
 
In Europe, mainly in the continental environment, the expropriation of minority 
investors’ wealth by large investors becomes the most important agency problem and, 
consequently, institutional shareholders are among the most relevant dominating 
shareholders, compensating for the weaknesses of investor protection laws (De Andrés 
et al., 2005; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Institutional investors affect corporate governance, 
being expected to connect with the companies in which they invest in an attempt to 
guarantee the sustainability of companies in the longer term (Ferrerira and Matos, 
2008). This particular agency problem has led to dominant block holders, concretely 
institutional investors, becoming directors. Accordingly, institutional directors have a 
significant influence on European Continental boards, accounting for 40% of 
directorship in Spain (Heidrick and Struggles, 2011) and, therefore, Spain becomes an 
interesting environment to explore the association between institutional directors and 
CEO pay.  
 
In this study we follow two steps. Firstly, we analyse the effect of institutional 
directors sitting on boards on CEO remuneration (total, fix and variable), given that 
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these directors represent institutional investors, who are large shareholders and, 
consequently, they might perform a relevant task in supervising managers and in the 
decision-making process, having an effect on CEO pay. The less prevalence of 
institutional directors appointed by institutional investors in the US and UK boards may 
explain the little research focused on how institutional investors impact on CEO pay 
when acting as directors. Second, we assume that institutional investors do not behave 
in a uniform way. Recent literature argues that their abilities and motivations to connect 
in corporate governance and their aims in doing so may be different (Almazán et al., 
2005; Cornett et al., 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Brickley et al. (1988) posit that 
the type of commercial links between companies and institutional investors describes 
the role of institutional investors and, consequently, the repercussion of institutional 
directors on CEO pay. Hence, business ties might raise conflicts of interest, as 
institutional investors without such relationships are probably to perform more 
independently and to engage actively in monitoring and, therefore, challenging and 
imposing controls on corporate managers. So, we distinguish between pressure-sensitive 
directors, who represent institutional investors that invest and maintain business ties 
with the firm where they are represented on boards, and pressure-resistant directors, 
who represent institutional investors that only maintain an investment relation with the 
company.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Next, the context in which this 
research is conducted is provided. The theoretical background and hypotheses are 
described in the third section. The fourth section describes the sample, the variables and 
the methodology. The results are shown in the fifth section. Finally, the conclusions, the 
study limitations and future research are provided. 
 
1.2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING  
 
The features of the corporate governance system may influence compensation policy 
(Álvarez and Neira, 2006; O’Reilly and Main, 2010). In this vein, the Spanish corporate 
governance environment is characterized by a low level of shareholder protection, the 
presence of controlling shareholders due to the high level of ownership concentration 
(De Andrés et al., 2005), the strong influence of pay practices between firms 
(Fernández-Alles et al., 2006), that is, firms tend to copy the remuneration practices of 
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other firms, and a one-tier board system (all directors, non-executives and executives, 
make up one board). Furthermore, De Miguel et al. (2004) point out that in Spain, in 
comparison to the US and the UK, the corporate control market is very unusual, and as 
a result, the expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth by controlling shareholders 
is the main agency problem. In addition, Spain has a financial system in which the 
presence of banks has been significant and important, not only as creditors, but also as 
shareholders and directors on the boards of the firms, as capital markets are less liquid, 
unlike the UK and US where financial markets play an important role.  
 
Thus, to increase the transparency of firms and the level of protection of minority 
shareholders, Spain has undergone both legal and institutional changes. Accordingly, 
several corporate governance codes have been issued. Focusing on compensation policy 
and given the importance of this issue, CUBG (2006) makes recommendations to 
improve transparency concerning remunerations both managers and directors, because 
transparency is essential to avoid excessive remunerations. In the same vein, in 2003 the 
Spanish Government enacted the Transparency Act (Law 26/2003) aimed at 
strengthening the transparency of Spanish listed companies. This law was the first to 
make it mandatory for listed companies to disclose details of directors’ compensation. 
Since 2011, and according to the Sustainable Economy Act (Law 2/2011), listed 
companies have to submit at the general meeting of shareholders both directors’ and 
senior executives’ compensation policy to a non-binding vote. Recently, the 
ECC/461/2013 Act was issued, whereby listed firms have to disclose the remuneration 
of their directors and managers individually. Finally, whereas the 31/2014 Act aims at 
upgrading and improving governance, making the creation of an appointment and 
remuneration committee mandatory, the last updated CUBG (2015) recommends 
separating this committee into two: an appointment committee and a remuneration 
committee. 
 
Three kinds of directors are distinguished in board of directors: executive, 
independent and institutional. Whereas executive directors are insiders and are directly 
involved in the management of the firm, both independent and institutional directors are 
considered outsiders, with different agendas and incentives in terms of controlling 
managers. Given the high ownership concentration of most European listed firms in 
continental countries such as Spain, Italy, and Germany, and in an intermediate position 
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countries such as France, dominant shareholders take important positions on boards, and 
strongly influence management. Among the dominant shareholders, institutional 
investors are one of the most important controlling shareholders in Europe (Crespí et al., 
2004). Accordingly, given that institutional investors, represented by institutional 
directors on boards, own most of the main European continental corporations (Spain, 
France and Italy), it is a meaningful public policy matter how institutional directors take 
part in the firm’s governance.  
 
Therefore, Spain provides a good scenario in which to examine how institutional 
directors may affect CEO pay. First, given the characteristics of the Spanish corporate 
governance system, the board is the main mechanism for mitigating the principal 
Spanish agency conflict (expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth by controlling 
shareholders). Second, as highlighted above, Spain is the European country with the 
highest proportion of institutional investors on boards. Concretely, 40% of the board 
directors in Spain are appointed by institutional investors.  
 
1.3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Agency theory is one of the main frameworks used to describe the design of 
compensation policies. According to this theory, the separation between the ownership 
(principal) and the management (agent) causes information asymmetries and conflicts of 
interest between them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Mechanisms for monitoring the 
alignment to resolve this conflict of interest between owners and managers are 
established by agency theory. Among these mechanisms, compensation policy is used to 
align the CEO’s behaviour with the owners’ interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The 
managerial power approach posits that CEOs have sufficient power to control the board 
and set or influence their own remuneration (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Hence, the 
greater the CEOs’ power the greater their capacity to increase their income.  
 
The academic literature shows that the monitoring role is played by institutional 
directors and not by independent directors (e.g. García-Osma and Gill de Albornoz, 
2007; Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014). In this respect, previous evidence 
reports that independent directors do not enhance corporate governance and increase or 
do not affect CEO compensation (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Feng et al., 2010; O’Reilly and 
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Main, 2010). Consequently, it will be interesting to explore the role of institutional 
directorship in determining CEO pay. 
 
Institutional investors can influence CEO compensation directly through monitoring 
activities (Gillan and Starks, 2000). According to Ryan and Schneider (2002), 
institutional investors are characterised by playing a relevant supervising role. In this 
regard, David and Kochhar (1996) argue that institutional investors have incentives to 
perform monitoring activities and affect CEO compensation, due to the larger 
proportion of shares usually held by them (Ozkan, 2011), making it difficult and costly 
to sell off their shares as such a move may negatively affect the stock price. 
Furthermore, institutional investors manage money from other people; hence, they have 
to safeguard their investment against loss of value through monitoring activities, and 
promoting changes such as those affecting CEO compensation (David and Kochhar, 
1996). Apart from these incentives, monitoring provides benefits such as skills to 
influence management, potential financial profit from such influence and better 
information (Chen et al., 2007), but it is highly costly. Therefore, monitoring activities 
is probably to be only cost-effective for institutional investors and, as a result, these 
activities are most likely to be borne by institutional investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). 
 
Additionally, institutional investors are convinced that CEOs are overpaid (Bebchuk 
and Grinstein 2005), and this may affect firm value (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990). 
Thus, institutional investors have reasons to sit on the board and actively cooperate in 
corporate governance problems. Furthermore, institutional shareholders are more 
effective in influencing the board than dispersed individual ownership (Cubbin and 
Leech 1983). Accordingly, institutional investor involvement reduces CEOs’ influence 
on boards that set compensation, and their presence on boards is linked with tighter 
control over CEO compensation (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), as they have the 
expertise and resources to do so (Lee and Chen, 2011).  
 
Prior literature shows the supervising role performed by institutional investors, 
concretely how they affect CEO compensation, according to investor interests. 
Specifically, while greater pay is preferred by the CEO, institutional directors seek 
lower CEO pay to increase the participation of shareholders in the firm’s rents (Werner 
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et al., 2005). In this vein, Hartzell and Starks (2003) evidence a negative association 
between institutional ownership concentration and management pay. These same results 
are obtained by Khan et al. (2005) and Ozkan (2011), who find a negative impact of 
large institutional investors on CEO compensation, showing the effectiveness of these 
owners in alleviating likely agency costs by reducing CEO compensation. The thesis 
that institutional investors decrease CEO pay is also suggested by Almazán et al. 
(2005), Core et al. (1999), Ezzeddine and Lamia (2006), Firth et al. (2007) and Ning et 
al. (2015). Sánchez-Marín et al. (2011) also report that the monitoring role performed 
by institutional investors reduces the compensation level of top management. Similarly, 
Cheng and Firth (2005) report that institutional ownership restrains executive pay and 
Gómez-Mejia et al. (2003) find that institutional investors reduce the long-term income 
for CEOs. This evidence supports the monitoring (supervision) hypothesis, which 
suggests that some directors (institutional directors) have motivations to supervise 
management teams, and consequently, these directors (institutional directors), when 
performing their monitoring role, will have a negative impact on CEO pay.  
 
However, authors like Croci et al. (2012), Feng et al. (2010), Fernandes et al. (2012), 
Khan et al. (2005), Lee and Chen (2011) and Victoravich et al. (2013) find that 
institutional ownership impacts positively on CEO pay. This may be because 
institutional owners have sufficient power to make decisions according to their own 
interests and against those of minority owners to maintain their controlling position 
(Cornett et al., 2007; Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2009). Therefore, 
institutional shareholders tend to negotiate privately with firms (Carleton et al., 1998) to 
get their own aims met, and thereby, they may entrench (collude) with management 
team (Pound, 1988). Accordingly, institutional directors are most probably that take part 
in tunnelling activities than in performing monitoring activities, namely, the 
expropriation of wealth from minority investors (Johnson et al., 2000). Other possible 
reason for this positive relationship between institutional directors and CEO pay may be 
because institutional directors rather than playing a monitoring role, they do not reduce 
agency problems, but they bring other benefits such as legitimacy, expertise, access to 
resources advice and to channels of information as other theoretical perspectives 
suggest (resource dependence theory and stewardship theory). Thus, CEOs may use 
their power and influence to get better compensation, according to their preferences, 
since institutional directors do not perform control activities to mitigate agency 
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problems. These views are consistent with the entrenchment (collusion) hypothesis, 
which posits that some directors (institutional directors) might have motivations to align 
with managers and, as a result, institutional directors will be most likely to support 
higher CEO pay. 
 
While prior literature demonstrates a linear association between institutional 
directors and CEO pay, a non-linear relationship between institutional directors and 
CEO pay has not yet been explored to the best of our knowledge. Nevertheless, a non-
linear relationship (may be U or an inverted U shaped) has been evidenced by authors 
who have analysed the relationship between the largest shareholders, such as 
institutional investors, and corporate performance (Claessens et al., 2002; Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000; Yeh, 2005). Concretely, Chirinko et al. (1999), Jara-Bertin et al. 
(2012), Navissi and Naiker (2006) and Zou (2010) show an inverted U-shape 
association between institutional shareholding and corporate performance. Therefore, 
the supervising hypothesis may be supported, given that a higher percentage of 
institutional directors on boards result in a higher corporate performance, but when their 
presence on boards reaches a tipping point, more institutional directors beyond this 
point will be negatively associated with firm value because they might, thus, entrench 
themselves and might achieve absolute control of firms and extract private benefits, 
confirming the entrenchment hypothesis. This non-linear relationship between 
institutional shareholding and corporate performance can be extended to the association 
between institutional directors and CEO compensation. 
 
These arguments and findings are in line with Brewer (1991), who proposes the 
theory of optimal distinctiveness. This theory posits that the outcomes of a group 
composition are expected to be non-linear: very low and very high proportions of 
certain characteristics (institutional directors) within a group (board of directors) result 
in more negative effects (It will result a higher CEO compensation when it was 
expected, according to prior research, a lower CEO compensation), while more positive 
effects (it will result a lower CEO compensation when it was expected, according to 
prior research, a lower CEO compensation) can occur when a balanced proportion of 
characteristics exists (a U-shaped). Accordingly, this would suggest that institutional 
directors not only may affect CEO compensation linearly, but also it is probable that a 
non-linear relationship could explain the impact. Additionally, a higher concentration of 
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power with other kinds of directors might be progressively more perceptible, as more 
institutional directors are appointed by institutional investors, and might, maybe, 
generate dissatisfaction with those not holding this power, that is, the increasing number 
of institutional directors in the company. Therefore, this discontent might result in 
individual effects such as lowered productivity or turnover, whose cooperative result 
would be adverse to firm performance. The power sharing among few directors limits 
this power to other directors, and as a consequence, this might have negative effects on 
company outcomes for having lost occasions to use this power, thus impacting on CEO 
compensation. In this way, two opposite effects on CEO compensation can be exerted 
by institutional directors, which cannot be supported by a linear relationship, but by a 
non-linear (a U shaped). 
 
Consequently, the representation of institutional directors on boards will allow them 
to perform a more active supervising role, preventing CEOs from controlling the board 
and behaving opportunistically, receiving a higher pay. However, due to the differences 
(e.g. legal restraints, investment aims and accountabilities) among institutional directors 
(Verstegen and Scheider, 2002), conflicts may increase when their representation rises 
on boards, and consequently, strategic choices, such as CEO compensation, can be 
affected by such differences (Hoskisson et al., 2002). In this regard, beyond a certain 
threshold, more institutional directors on boards may generate coordination problems, 
and thus, efficient monitoring by these directors may be lost; this may be exploited by 
the CEO to collude with institutional directors. In this way, institutional directors reach 
their own goals and the CEO increases his/her managerial discretion, gaining greater 
compensation. These arguments support a non-linear association between institutional 
directors and CEO pay. 
 
Hence, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
H1a: There is a non-linear association between institutional directorship and 
the CEO total compensation. Institutional directors affect the CEO total 
compensation negatively, but when they reach a tipping point, they impact on it 
positively.  
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On the other hand, institutional directors may also affect the structure of CEO 
compensation (Shin and Seo, 2010). Thus, if institutional directors perform monitoring 
activities effectively, they will prefer more CEO fix compensation and less CEO 
variable compensation, because despite the fact that the variable compensation is 
expected to impact positively on firm value and align manager’s and shareholders’ 
interests, variable compensation may boost the opposite behaviour. Thus, variable pay 
might foster CEO to pay more attention to the short-term stock price (Peng and Röell, 
2008) and, then, CEO may have motivations to manipulate earnings (Bergstresser and 
Philippon 2006). Furthermore, variable components might also promote a higher CEO 
entrenchment (Croci et al., 2012). Accordingly, if monitoring through institutional 
directors is possible, the demand of variable compensation by these directors will be 
lower, as direct monitoring by institutional directors might substitute for variable 
compensation (Ke at al., 1999).  
 
Thus, based on above arguments, we also posit the following hypothesis:  
 
H1b: Institutional directors influence the CEO fix compensation positively, and 
the CEO variable compensation negatively  
 
Nevertheless, institutional directors (banks, pension funds, mutual funds or insurance 
companies, among others) are a heterogeneous group, and as a result, they employ 
different investment strategies and incentives to participate in corporate governance 
(Bennett et al., 2003). In this vein, the efficiency of supervising by institutional directors 
is affected by the commercial ties, limiting both their ability to monitor and their 
influence. Thus, institutional directors can be classified into two groups: pressure-
sensitive institutional directors and pressure-resistant institutional directors (e.g. 
Almazán et al., 2005; Brickley et al., 1988; Chen et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 2007; 
López-Iturriaga et al., 2015; Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014; Ruiz-Mallorquí 
and Santana-Martín, 2009). 
 
Pressure-resistant institutional directors (investment funds, mutual funds and pension 
funds) represent institutional investors that only have an investment relation with 
companies in which they have invested and, consequently, they do not have to face 
conflict of interest arising from commercial links. This allows them to be more 
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independent of the firm, and consequently, it is more probable that they will take an 
active part in monitoring and exerting pressure to instigate changes (Almazán et al., 
2005; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Jara-Bertín et al., 2012; Pucheta-Martínez and García-
Meca, 2014; Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2009), thereby mitigating agency 
problems between shareholders and managers. Additionally, these directors prefer to 
invest in a long-term horizon (Tihanyi et al., 2003). Therefore, they are more likely to 
play actively a supervising role and might affect firm operations, according to 
shareholders’ interests, and are less exposed to pressure from companies where they 
have invested. Hence, from an agency theory perspective, pressure-resistant directors 
will have less conflict of interest to prevent them from implement monitoring actions, 
and will, accordingly, have the ability to act as active monitors of the firm management 
(Brickley et al., 1988) and, as a consequence, they will support to decrease CEO 
compensation, among others. 
 
In this sense, previous research provides evidence that pressure-resistant institutional 
directors reduce agency conflict through lowering levels of executive compensation. 
Accordingly, Parthiban et al. (1998) show a negative relationship between pressure-
resistant institutional ownership and CEO compensation. Similarly, Dong and Ozkan 
(2008) also demonstrate that director pay is constrained by pressure-resistant 
institutional directors. In the same way, Almazan et al. (2005) and López-Iturriaga et al. 
(2015) stress that pressure-resistant institutional directors are negatively associated with 
CEO compensation, and Shin and Seo (2011) find that pension funds, as pressure-
resistant directors, have a negative influence on CEO compensation. Furthermore, Shin 
(2011) highlights that pressure-resistant institutional directors, to reduce agency 
conflict, prefer to monitor CEO compensation rather than linking it to firm 
performance, as such pay schemes may encourage the CEO to engage in fraudulent 
behaviour (Zhang et al., 2008). Therefore, it is probable that pressure-resistant 
institutional directors will reduce CEO compensation due to their monitoring role. 
However, Jiao and Ye (2013) extend the non-linear relationship (an inverted U shaped) 
shown by Jara-Bertín et al. (2012) and Navissi and Naiker (2006) between institutional 
directors and corporate performance to pressure-resistant institutional directors, 
showing an inverted U-shaped association between firms’ future performance and 
pressure-resistant institutional investors. Thus, this research shows the monitoring role 
played by pressure-resistant directors regarding the management team, since their 
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presence on boards enhances firm value; however, when the percentage of pressure-
resistant directors exceeds a certain point, the supervision role performed by them 
becomes ineffective because their influence on managers decreases. Thereby, the 
increase of pressure-resistant directors beyond a certain point may lead to divert from 
value creation, since they pursue their own interests and it is more probable that they 
may collude or entrench with the management team to extract personal profits. As a 
consequence, they will impact negatively on firm performance. Hence, we extend the 
arguments that support a non-linear association between pressure-resistant directors and 
firm value to the analysis between pressure-resistant and CEO compensation. Thus, we 
posit, in line with institutional directors as a whole, that efficient monitoring will result 
in a negative relationship between pressure-resistant institutional directors and CEO 
compensation to some extent, but when their presence on boards reaches a certain point, 
both conflicts of interest and coordination problems may appear between pressure-
resistant directors, and these may be exploited by CEOs to ensure their own aims are 
met, for example obtaining greater compensation, since efficient monitoring may be 
lost, and the CEO may achieve more control and power and may collude with pressure-
resistant directors (Jiao and Ye, 2013). Accordingly, there might be a non-linear (a U 
shaped) influence of pressure-resistant on CEO compensation, rather than a linear 
relationship. 
 
In contrast, pressure-sensitive institutional directors (banks and insurance 
companies), are appointed by pressure-sensitive investors, who apart of investing in 
firms, also have a commercial relation with the firm. Thus, it is possible that the main 
objective of pressure-sensitive institutional investors, unlike pressure-resistant investors, 
is not simply to maximize the firm value, but also to expand their own businesses and 
derive private profits (Cuervo, 2002; Gorton and Schmid, 2000). As a result, pressure-
sensitive institutional directors are more likely to face conflicts of interest arising from 
the business relationships (Almazán et al., 2005; Shin and Seo, 2011), as they may 
jeopardize the business relationship if they propose changes (Chen et al., 2007). Thus, 
pressure-sensitive directors may prefer not monitoring firm CEO and it is more likely 
they support CEO actions (Brickley et al, 1998). Furthermore, pressure-sensitive 
institutional directors bear higher monitoring costs than pressure-resistant directors, 
because the effort required from pressure-sensitive investors to monitor managers is 
greater due to the need to protect their business relationship (Almazan et al., 2005; 
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Chen, et al., 2007). Hence, this dependent position makes that pressure-sensitive 
directors may lack of the incentives, motivations and abilities to effectively monitor 
managers. In this vein, previous research finds that pressure-sensitive institutional 
directors impact negatively on firm decisions, given the double relation that maintain 
with the firm, which is opposite to shareholders’ interests (e.g. Brickley et al., 1988; 
Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2009, 2011; Tribó and Casasola, 2010). 
Additionally, another reason that could explain their lack of incentives to monitor 
managers is that they face fiduciary standards and prefer short-term earnings, whereby 
they prefer to invest in short-term horizons (see Van der Stede, 2013). 
 
Pressure-sensitive institutional directors, particularly banks, play a much broader role 
because they act as shareholders, directors and creditors and are, therefore, well-
informed investors. Accordingly, they may be an effective mechanism for mitigating 
agency problems and protecting minority shareholders (Canals, 1995). Nonetheless, 
given the low level of shareholder protection in civil law countries, their ability to 
create, dominate and control corporate groups (Morck and Nakamura, 1999) and the use 
of privileged information to seek enhancing their business, creating alliances with 
managers or other stakeholders allows pressure-sensitive institutional directors to make 
private gains or profits at the expense of minority shareholders (Gorton and Schmid, 
2000; Roe, 2003). Thus, given that pressure-sensitive directors may face higher costs of 
extracting private benefits, since most of them are under strict control by regulatory 
authorities (Maury and Pajuste, 2005), they might collude with the CEO to protect their 
business ties, supporting the CEO’s decisions (the collusion hypothesis). Consequently, 
the CEO will receive higher compensation. In this regard, David et al. (1998), López-
Iturriaga et al. (2015) and Shin and Seo (2011) show that pressure-sensitive directors 
increase CEO compensation. 
 
Nevertheless, when the representation of pressure-sensitive directors on boards 
exceeds a tipping point, they may play a more effective role in the firm governance, 
which may have a negative effect on CEO pay (the supervision hypothesis). Despite 
pressure-sensitive institutional directors are able to create coalitions to derive private 
benefits (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Jara-Bertín et al., 2008), they might be 
interested in preventing the formation of agreements between themselves and the CEO 
to avoid expropriation activities, as their presence on boards increases. This idea is 
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supported by De Andrés et al. (2010), who report that when another shareholder can 
take advantage of a controlling position, the presence of banks on boards is positively 
associated with firm value. This is because pressure-sensitive directors, concretely 
banks, acting as shareholders and lenders, may perform more monitoring activities (De 
Andrés et al., 2010) to mitigate the opportunistic behaviour of a new controlling 
shareholder (Mahrt-Smith, 2006). Thus, when the presence of pressure-sensitive 
directors on boards rises beyond a certain point, the monitoring role played by them in 
contesting the power of other large shareholders is enhanced (Gomes and Novaes, 
2005), and thereby, could be used to monitor CEO decisions (e.g. CEO compensation) 
and prevent the collusion between CEO and other pressure-sensitive directors. As a 
result, they might influence to challenge the power of controlling owners and dominant 
shareholders, enhancing corporate governance, which may lead to decrease CEO pay. 
The combination of these ideas supports a non-linear relationship (an inverted U 
shaped) between pressure-sensitive institutional directors and CEO compensation, based 
on the hypotheses of entrenchment or collusion and supervision. This non-linear 
relationship is supported by De Andrés et al. (2010) and Morck et al. (2000), who 
analysed the relationship between pressure-sensitive institutional ownership and firm 
value (a U shaped). 
 
To the best of our knowledge, a non-linear relationship between pressure-
sensitive/pressure-resistant directors and CEO pay has not yet been explored. Therefore, 
based on above arguments, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H2a: There is a nonlinear relationship between pressure-sensitive institutional 
directors and the CEO total compensation. Pressure-sensitive directors 
influence the CEO total compensation positively, but when they reach a certain 
threshold, they affect it negatively. 
 
H2b: There is a nonlinear relationship between pressure-resistant institutional 
directors and the CEO total compensation. Pressure-resistant directors 
influence the CEO total compensation negatively, but when they reach a certain 
threshold, they affect it positively. 
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As mentioned above, institutional directors might impact on the composition of CEO 
pay. Hence, pressure-resistant directors are less likely to receive pressure from firms 
where they have invested, because they do not tend to maintain a business relation with 
the firm, and are characterised by a long-term orientation and, therefore, they will 
actively perform monitoring activities and will prefer more CEO fix compensation and 
less CEO variable pay for the views suggested in prior hypotheses. However, pressure-
sensitive institutional directors will prefer more variable than fix compensation, as these 
directors prefer to invest in short-term horizon and short term earnings and variable 
component allows CEO to focus on the short-term stock price (Peng and Röell, 2008). 
Additionally, Croci et al. (2012) report that CEO entrenchment may be enhanced by 
variable components and, therefore, pressure-sensitive directors will align with the CEO 
to gain more power in order to not damage their business with the firm where they serve 
as board members. 
 
Hence, according to above arguments, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
H2c: Pressure-sensitive institutional directors influence the CEO fix (variable) 
compensation negatively (positively), while pressure-resistant institutional 
directors influence the CEO fix (variable) compensation positively (negatively). 
 
1.4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
1.4.1. Sample 
 
The sample for the panel data analysis was extracted from the population of Spanish 
non-financial listed firms for the period 2010–2014. Financial companies have been 
removed from the sample because of their particular accounting practices, which make 
it more difficult to compare their financial statements to those of companies in other 
business activities as they are not homogeneous. Furthermore, financial companies are 
under stricter supervision by financial authorities, so the role of their boards may be 
restricted by this control. An unbalanced panel consisting of 553 firm-year observations 
was drawn. Causes such as mergers, takeovers or other companies going public explain 
the unbalanced panel. However, Arellano (2003) argues that findings obtained for such 
panels are as trustworthy as those achieved by balanced panels. 
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Different sources were consulted to build the database. Financial information was 
obtained from the “Sistemas de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos” (SABI) database, 
whereas corporate governance information and the CEO compensation figures were 
obtained from the public registers of the Spanish Securities Market Commission 
(CNMV), particularly from the corporate governance and directors’ remuneration 
reports that companies have had to disclose annually since 2003 and 2011, respectively. 
The annual reports disclose the data for two consecutive years. 
 
1.4.2. Variables 
 
Three dependent variables are defined to test the hypotheses. CEO_PAY is the CEO 
total compensation, measured as the logarithm of the CEO’s total compensation. 
Authors such as Baixauli-Soler and Sánchez-Marín (2011), Croci et al. (2012), Conyon 
and He (2016), David et al. (1998), Kanagaretnam et al. (2016), Lin and Lin (2014) and 
Shin and Seo (2011), among others, also use the logarithm of the CEO compensation as 
the dependent variable. FIX_CEO_PAY is the proportion of the CEO fix compensation, 
calculated as the ratio between the total fix CEO compensation and the CEO total 
compensation, and VAR_CEO_PAY is the proportion of the CEO variable 
compensation, measures as the ratio between the total CEO variable compensation and 
the CEO total compensation (López-Iturriaga et al. 2015). 
 
Several independent variables are used to examine how the presence of institutional 
investors on boards is associated with CEO pay. The variable for institutional directors, 
who represent institutional investors on boards, is defined as INST and is calculated as 
the percentage of institutional directors sitting on boards (López-Iturriaga et al., 2015; 
Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014). Institutional directors are also differentiated 
into pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant directors. Thus, the variable SENSIT 
represents the proportion of pressure-sensitive directors on boards and RESIST 
represents the proportion of pressure-resistant directors on boards (García-Meca et al., 
2013; López-Iturriaga et al., 2015; Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014). Finally, 
the square of the proportion of institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant 
directors is used to analyse whether these directors affect CEO compensation in a non-
linear way. These variables are defined as INST2, SENSIT2 and RESIST2, respectively. 
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CEO compensation may be affected by other factors. Thus, several variables are 
taken into account to control for these factors. First, firm size is included. This is 
defined as SIZE and measured as the logarithm of total assets (Victoravich et al., 2013). 
Previous research shows a positive relationship between firm size and CEO 
compensation (e.g. Baixauli-Soler and Sánchez-Marín, 2011; Core et al., 1999; Lee and 
Chen, 2011; López-Iturriaga et al., 2015; Ozkan, 2007). Return on assets is also 
controlled. It is defined as ROA and is measured as operating income before interest 
and taxes over total assets. Whereas authors like Lee and Chen (2011) and William 
(2001) find a positive association between ROA and CEO compensation, Mehran 
(1995) reports a negative relationship between ROA and the CEO compensation. 
Duality in the position of the CEO and president of the board of directors is also 
included as a control variable, defined as CEO_DUALITY and measured as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the same person is both CEO and chairman of the board and 0, 
otherwise. Core et al. (1999), David et al. (1998) and Shin and Seo (2011) show that 
CEO compensation is greater when the CEO is also the board president, suggesting that 
when the CEO and chairman are the same person, CEO power increases and he/she is 
able to exert a positive influence on his/her compensation. The length of time for which 
the CEO has performed this role is also considered as a control variable, defined as 
CEO_TENURE and measured as the number of years that CEO has held the position. 
Chung and Pruitt (1996) suggest the longer the CEO tenure the more he/she may be able 
to influence the board of directors and his/her compensation, according to his/her 
interests. This idea is also evidenced by Shin and Seo (2011), who show a positive 
relationship between the CEO tenure and the CEO compensation. CEO ownership is 
also controlled, defined as CEO_OWN, and calculated as the percentage of shares held 
by CEOs. We argue that CEOs who hold a high proportion of firm’s stocks have the 
power to set high compensation level. This view is supported by Wright and Kroll 
(2002) and Ozkan (2011), who find that CEO or executive shareholdings affect 
positively CEO pay. The number of meetings held by the board, defined as BDMEET, 
is also included as a control variable, as the CUBG (2015) suggests that the board 
should meet as often as necessary to perform its supervisory and controlling role 
effectively. Hence, the more meetings held by board the more efficient may be its 
monitoring role and this may reduce CEO compensation. However, there are firms that 
pay when directors attend meetings (López-Iturriaga et al., 2015), which suggests a 
positive association between board meetings and CEO compensation. The independence 
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of the board is also considered, defined as INDP and calculated as the proportion of 
independent directors on boards. Authors such as Buigut et al. (2014) and Jian and Lee 
(2015), among others, find a negative relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors and CEO compensation. Management ownership is also 
considered, defined as OWNMAN and measured as the proportion of shares held by 
directors. Ozkan (2007) demonstrates a negative relationship between the stocks held by 
directors and CEO compensation. Finally, we also consider year fixed effects to control 
for year effects on CEO compensation. 
 
In Table 1 we provide the description of variables. 
 
Table 1 
Variable description 
Variables Expected Sign Description 
CEO_PAY  Logarithm of the CEO’s total compensation 
FIX_CEO_PAY  The ratio between the total CEO fix compensation and the CEO total compensation 
VAR_CEO_PAY  The ratio between the total CEO variable compensation and the CEO total compensation 
INST - Ratio between the number of institutional directors and the total number of directors on the board 
INST2 + The square of INST 
SENSIT + 
Ratio between the number of institutional directors who 
represent pressure-sensitive institutional investors on the 
board and the total number of directors on boards 
SENSIT2 - The square of SENSIT 
RESIST - 
Ratio between the number of institutional directors who 
represent pressure-resistant institutional investors on the 
board and the total number of directors 
RESIST2 + The square of RESIST 
SIZE + Logarithm of total assets 
ROA +/- Operate incomes before interests and taxes over total assets 
CEO_DUALITY + Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO and president of the board 
are the same and 0, otherwise 
CEO_TENURE + The years that the CEO has performed the firm’s top higher position 
CEO_OWN + The percentage of shares held by CEO 
BDMEET +/- Number of meetings held by the board in a year. 
INDP - Ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of directors on boards 
OWNMAN - Proportion of shares held by directors. 
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1.5. RESULTS 
 
1.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The mean value, the standard deviation and the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles are 
provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Main Descriptive Statistics 
Mean, standard deviation and percentiles of the main variables. Panel A and B show the 
continuous and dummy variables, respectively. CEO_PAY is the logarithm of the CEO total 
compensation; FIX_CEO_PAY is the ratio between the total CEO fix compensation and the 
CEO total compensation; VAR_CEO_PAY is the ratio between the total CEO variable 
compensation and the CEO total compensation; INST is the proportion of institutional directors 
on board; SENSIT is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-
sensitive institutional investors; RESIST is the proportion of the board directors who are 
representative of pressure-resistant institutional investors; BDMEET is the number of meetings 
held by the board in a year; CEO_TENURE is the number of years the CEO has held the firm’s 
higher position; CEO_OWN is the percentage of shares held by CEO; INDP is the proportion of 
independent directors on board; OWNMAN is the proportion of stocks held by directors; ROA 
is the operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; SIZE is the logarithm of total 
assets and CEO_DUALITY equals to 1 if CEO and president of the board are the same person 
and 0, otherwise. 
 
Panel A. Continuous variables 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Perc. 10th Perc. 50tf Perc. 90th 
CEO_PAY 553 4.252 3.184 0.000 5.537 7.712 
FIX_CEO_PAY 553 84.883 35.711 51.613 100.000 100.000 
VAR_CEO_PAY 553 15.117 35.710 0.000 0.000 22.393 
INST 553 44.290 28.322 11.111 44.444 75.00 
SENSIT 553 7.580 13.821 0.000 0.000 26.667 
RESIST 553 36.710 26.617 0.000 33.333 71.429 
BDMEET 553 9.707 3.979 5.000 10.000 14.000 
CEO_TENURE 553 1.714 1.514 0.000 1.000 4.000 
CEO_OWN 553 5.516 15.243 0.000 0.001 22.393 
INDP 553 33.383 18.513 11.111 33.333 60.000 
OWNMAN 553 27.726 27.578 0.032 21.193 66.900 
ROA 553 -1.445 55.683 -16.208 1.584 14.533 
SIZE 553 13.054 2.095 10.608 13.059 15.686 
 
Panel B. Dummies variables 
Variable 0 % (0) 1 % (1) 
CEO_DUALITY 376 67.993 177 32.007 
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As can be seen, on average, the CEO total compensation (CEO_PAY) is 4.25 (the 
logarithm of the CEO total pay). The proportion of the CEO fix compensation accounts, 
on average, for 84.88%, while the proportion of the CEO variable compensation is, on 
average, 15.12%. Regarding the composition of boards of directors, 44.29% of the 
directors represent institutional investors (INST); of these, 36.71% institutional 
directors are representatives of institutional investors maintaining solely an investment 
relationship with the firms in which they invest (pressure-resistant directors: RESIST) 
and 7.58% of institutional directors represent institutional investors maintaining both a 
business and an investment relationship with the firms (pressure-sensitive directors: 
SENSIT). Moreover, the proportion of independent directors on boards (INDP) is 
33.38%, on average.  
 
With respect to other variables, on average, the profitability (ROA) and the firm size 
(SIZE) are -1.45% and 13.05 (logarithm of total assets), respectively. The boards of 
directors held 9.71 meetings per year (BDMEET), on average, a figure that exceeds the 
recommendation of the CUBG (2015) (eight meetings/year). Finally, 32% of the sample 
firms have the same person as CEO and chairman of the board of directors 
(CEO_DUALITY), the average length of CEO tenure is 1.7 years (CEO_TENURE), the 
percentage of shares held by CEOs (CEO_OWN) is 5.52% and directors hold 27.73% 
of stocks (OWN_MAN). 
 
1.5.2. Univariate analysis 
 
An analysis of mean differences was performed for the independent variables. Two 
groups were constructed to study mean differences between the independent variables, 
depending on whether the firms provide a higher total CEO compensation, a higher 
proportion of the CEO fix compensation and a higher proportion of the CEO variable 
compensation, or not. The critical value for creating the two groups was the median of 
the CEO total compensation, of the proportion of the CEO fix compensation and of the 
proportion of the CEO variable compensation; thus, firms with these three types of 
compensation equal to or higher than their medians were included in the first group, 
whereas companies with these types of CEO compensation amounting to less than their 
medians were incorporated in the second group. 
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Table 3, Panel A, shows the mean values of the independent variables, from which it 
can be seen that the companies with a greater presence of institutional directors (INST) 
and pressure-resistant directors (RESIST) on boards compensate their CEOs less than 
companies with a lower presence of such directors. These results, which are statistically 
significant, show that institutional directors are more likely to reduce CEO total 
compensation. This finding is consistent with previous research that focuses on 
institutional directors and CEO total compensation (Almazan et al., 2005; Core et al., 
1999; David et al., 1998; Dong and Ozkan, 2008; Ezzeddine and Lamia, 2006; Firth et 
al., 2007; López-Iturriaga et al., 2015; Ning et al., 2015; Sánchez-Marín et al., 2011). 
Hence, these results suggest that institutional directors and pressure-resistant directors 
have a negative impact on CEO total compensation, and therefore, the presence of such 
directors on boards tends to reduce agency problems, reducing CEO total pay. 
 
Regarding pressure-sensitive directors, CEOs receive higher compensation in firms 
in which the presence of these directors on boards is greater. Despite this positive 
relationship between pressure-sensitive directors and CEO total compensation, which is 
confirmed by David et al. (1998), López-Iturriaga et al. (2015) and Shin and Seo 
(2011), our findings do not support this association as the mean difference is not 
statistically significant.  
 
Panel B and C of the Table 3 show the mean values of all independent variables to 
examine whether there are differences for the proportion of the CEO fix and variable 
CEO compensation. According to the figures provided by Panel B and C in Table 3, the 
proportion of institutional and pressure-resistant directors is higher in firms that support 
an increase in the CEO fix compensation and a decrease in the CEO variable 
compensation than firms with a lower percentage of such directors, while the percentage 
of pressure-sensitive directors is higher in companies that prefer to compensate CEOs 
with more variable compensation and with less fix compensation. This evidence is in 
line with our expectations and prior evidence (Croci et al., 2012), and all the mean 
differences are statistically significant. 
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Table 3 
Means comparison test 
CEO_PAY is the logarithm of the CEO total compensation; FIX_CEO_PAY is the ratio 
between the total CEO fix compensation and the CEO total compensation; VAR_CEO_PAY is 
the ratio between the total CEO variable compensation and the CEO total compensation; INST 
is the proportion of institutional directors on board; SENSIT is the proportion of the board 
directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors; RESIST is the 
proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-resistant institutional 
investors.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.5.3 Multivariate analysis 
 
The correlation matrix to check for multicollinearity is displayed in Table 4. None of 
the correlation coefficients are sufficiently high (> 0.80) to cause multicollinearity 
problems (Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001), except the pairs INST-RESIST and 
FIX_CEO_PAY-VAR_CEO_PAY. However, these pairs are correlated by definition as 
these are relationships between corporate governance variables and compensation 
Panel A. CEO total compensation 
 
Variable 
CEO_PAY          
(>= median) 
Mean 
CEO_PAY            
(< median) 
Mean 
Mean 
difference 
 
p-value 
INST 42.821 46.571 -3.750 0.059 
SENSIT 7.793 7.370 0.423 0.359 
RESIST 34.073 39.318 -5.245 0.010 
Panel C. Variable CEO compensation 
Variable 
VAR_CEO_PAY         
(> median) 
Mean 
VAR_CEO_PAY       
(= median) 
Mean 
Mean 
difference 
 
p-value 
INST 42.118 46.126 -4.008 0.056 
SENSIT 8.926 6.840 2.086 0.045 
RESIST 33.155 38.661 -5.506 0.010 
Panel B. Fix CEO compensation 
Variable 
FIX_CEO_PAY      
(>= median) 
Mean 
FIX_CEO_PAY      
(< median) 
Mean 
Mean 
difference 
 
p-value 
INST 46.106 42.175 3.931 0.059 
SENSIT 6.860 8.881 -2.021 0.049 
RESIST 38.620 33.257 5.363 0.011 
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variables, and these pairs of variables are not incorporated in the model at the same 
time. Consequently, and according to these results, the models used have no 
multicollinearity issues. 
 
In Table 5, we provide the results of the hierarchical regression conducted to 
examine the effect of institutional directors sit on boards on CEO compensation (total, 
fix and variable compensation), using four models. In model 1, where the impact of 
institutional directors on the CEO total compensation is analysed, in the first step we 
enter the control variables, in the second step we enter the linear variable of institutional 
directors (INST) and in the third step we enter the non-linear variable of institutional 
directors (INST2). Thus, among the control variables, firm size, CEO duality and CEO 
tenure exhibit a positive sign, as expected, and are statistically significant, while board 
independence shows a negative sign, as predicted, and is statistically significant. The 
linear INST variable is significant and negatively associated to the CEO total 
compensation, explaining an additional 0.30% of the variance beyond that explained by 
the control variables. The non-linear INST2 term is positive and significantly associated 
to the CEO total compensation, explaining an additional 0.50% of the variance beyond 
that explained by the other two steps. Therefore, this evidence leads us not to reject the 
hypothesis H1a. The results indicate that the proportion of institutional directors on 
boards reduces the CEO total compensation, but when the percentage of such directors 
reaches a certain point, they will be more likely to support a higher CEO total pay. This 
non-linear relation, specifically a U shaped, is in line with previous studies (Chirinko et 
al., 1999; Jara-Bertín et al., 2012; Navissi and Naiker, 2006; Zou, 2010), which show 
that institutional directors may play two opposite roles: at low levels of representation, 
monitoring activities are undertaken by institutional directors, which reduce CEO 
compensation (e.g. Almazán et al., 2005; Ezzeddine and Lamia, 2006; Firth et al., 2007; 
Ning et al., 2015; Sánchez-Marín et al., 2011). However, these directors increase CEO 
compensation (Croci et al., 2012; Feng et al., 2010; Fernandes et al., 2012) when their 
presence on boards reaches a certain threshold, and thus, they may collude with the 
CEO and be used to further the CEO’s own ends. Therefore, earlier evidence supports 
these findings and the presence of a U-shaped relationship between institutional 
directors and the CEO total compensation. Thereby, these results suggest the validity of 
both the monitoring and the entrenchment hypotheses. 
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix 
CEO_PAY is the logarithm of the CEO total compensation; FIX_CEO_PAY is the ratio between the total CEO fix compensation and the CEO total 
compensation; VAR_CEO_PAY is the ratio between the total CEO variable compensation and the CEO total compensation; INST is the proportion of 
institutional directors on board; SENSIT is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors; RESIST is 
the proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-resistant institutional investors; BDMEET is the number of meetings held by the board 
in a year; CEO_TENURE is the number of years the CEO has held the firm’s higher position; CEO_OWN is the percentage of shares held by CEO; INDP is 
the proportion of independent directors on board; OWNMAN is the proportion of stocks held by directors; SIZE is the logarithm of total assets; ROA is the 
operate income before interests and taxes over total assets and CEO_DUALITY equals to 1 if CEO  and president of the board are the same person and 0, 
otherwise. * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
CEO_PAY FIX_CEO_PAY VAR_CEO_PAY INST SENSIT RESIST BDMEET CEO_DUALITY CEO_TENURE CEO_OWN INDP OWNMAN ROA SIZE 
CEO_PAY 1             
 
FIX_CEO_PAY -0.693*** 1            
 
VAR_CEO_PAY 0.693*** -1.000 1           
 
INST -0.145*** 0.082* -0.082* 1          
 
SENSIT 0.043 -0.109** 0.109** 0.206*** 1         
 
RESIST -0.151*** 0.096** -0.096** 0.826*** -0.269*** 1        
 
BDMEET 0.182*** -0.156*** 0.156*** 0.117*** -0.007 0.099** 1       
 
CEO_DUALITY 0.352*** -0.110*** 0.110*** -0.315*** -0.100** -0.263*** 0.028 1      
 
CEO_TENURE 0.682*** -0.439*** 0.439*** -0.228*** -0.046 -0.181*** -0.055 0.378*** 1     
 
CEO_OWN 0.420*** -0.108** 0.108** -0.274*** -0.072* -0.223*** -0.092** 0.543*** 0.515*** 1    
 
INDP 0.090** -0.116*** 0.116*** -0.683*** -0.192*** -0.527*** 0.046 0.154*** 0.072* 0.106** 1   
 
OWNMAN 0.015 0.124*** -0.124*** 0.194*** -0.034 0.227*** -0.149*** 0.164*** 0.143*** 0.304*** -0.276*** 1  
 
ROA 0.080* -0.202*** -0.202*** -0.125*** -0.017 -0.098** -0.086** 0.010 0.051 -0.047 0.107** -0.151*** 1 
 
SIZE 0.610*** -0.555*** -0.555*** -0.036 0.194*** -0.116*** 0.284*** 0.005 0.280*** -0.002 0.131*** -0.255*** 0.141*** 1 
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Table 5 
Results of the hierarchical regression for institutional directors sit on the board of directors 
Estimated coefficients. CEO_PAY is the logarithm of the CEO total compensation; FIX_CEO_PAY is the ratio between the total CEO fix compensation and the CEO total compensation; 
VAR_CEO_PAY is the ratio between the total CEO variable compensation and the CEO total compensation; INST is the proportion of institutional directors on board; SENSIT is the proportion 
of the board directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors; RESIST is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-resistant institutional 
investors; BDMEET is the number of meetings held by the board in a year; CEO_TENURE is the number of years the CEO has held the firm’s higher position; CEO_OWN is the percentage of 
shares held by CEO; INDP is the proportion of independent directors on board; OWNMAN is the proportion of stocks held by directors; SIZE is the logarithm of total assets; ROA is the operate 
income before interests and taxes over total assets and CEO_DUALITY equals to 1 if CEO  and president of the board are the same person and 0, otherwise. * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables   Model 1 CEO_PAY 
Model 2 
FIX_CEO_PAY 
Model 3 
VAR_CEO_PAY 
 Step1 Step2 Step3 Step1 Step2 Step1 Step2 
Control variables:        
SIZE 0.207*** (0.000) 
0.256*** 
(0.000) 
0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.032*** 
(0.000) 
0.019** 
(0.011) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.027*** 
(0.000) 
ROA -0.119 (0.251) 
-0.095 
(0.389) 
-0.085 
(0.457) 
-0.021 
(0.195) 
-0.028* 
(0.069) 
0.013 
(0.102) 
0.016* 
(0.057) 
CEO_DUALITY 1.144*** (0.000) 
1.075*** 
(0.000) 
0.958*** 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.514) 
-0.005 
(0.878) 
0.024 
(0.405) 
0.017 
(0.562) 
CEO_TENURE 1.200*** (0.000) 
1.174*** 
(0.000) 
1.130*** 
(0.000) 
-0.040*** 
(0.000) 
-0.033*** 
(0.001) 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.036*** 
(0.000) 
CEO_OWN 0.005 (0.440) 
-0.001 
(0.900) 
-0.005 
(0.363) 
0.001* 
(0.084) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.009) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
BDMEET 0.018 (0.449) 
0.032 
(0.208) 
0.043* 
(0.095) 
0.007** 
(0.030) 
-0.003 
(0.302) 
-0.002 
(0.346) 
-0.001 
(0.687) 
INDP -1.762*** (0.000) 
-2.655*** 
(0.000) 
-3.513*** 
(0.000) 
0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.562*** 
(0.000) 
-0.124** 
(0.014) 
-0.212*** 
(0.001) 
OWNMAN -0.306 (0.403) 
0.034 
(0.931) 
0.402 
(0.273) 
0.364*** 
(0.000) 
0.274*** 
(0.000) 
-0.185*** 
(0.005) 
-0.152** 
(0.013) 
Linear variable:         
INST  -1.305** (0.043) 
-3.822*** 
(0.000)  
0.344*** 
(0.000)  
-0.129*** 
(0.001) 
Non-Linear variable:        
INST2   1.316*** (0.000)    
 
Observations 
F 
R2 
∆R2 
553 
250.63*** 
84.40% 
 
553 
236.79*** 
84.70% 
0.30% 
553 
228.81*** 
85.20% 
0.50% 
553 
209.33*** 
81.90% 
 
553 
203.03*** 
82.60% 
0.70% 
553 
15.98*** 
24.60% 
553 
15.17*** 
25.00% 
0.40% 
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In model 2 and 3 in Table 5, we analyse how institutional directors affect the CEO 
fix and variable compensation, respectively, performing hierarchical regression analyses 
in two steps. In both models we enter the control variables in the first step, while in the 
second step we enter the linear INST term. Following the same procedure than in model 
1, we consider two steps in model 2 and 3. In model 2 and 3, the proportions of the 
CEO fix and variable compensation, respectively, are regressed on control variables in 
step 1, while the linear INST term is entered in step 2 in both models. The linear INST 
variable is positive and significantly related to the proportion of the CEO fix 
compensation in model 2, explaining an additional 0.70% of the variance beyond that 
explained by the control variables in step 1. In model 3, the linear INST variable is 
negative and significantly associated to the proportion of the CEO variable 
compensation, explaining an additional 0.40% of the variance beyond that explained by 
the control variables in step 1. These findings supports the hypotheses H1b, suggesting 
that institutional directors on boards are most likely to increase the CEO fix 
compensation and to decrease the CEO variable compensation, in line with previous 
evidence (Croci et al., 2012; Ke at al., 1999). The CEO variable pay may cause an 
increase in CEO entrenchment, and as a result, CEO may behave against the 
shareholder’s interest. An effective monitoring role played by institutional directors 
may imply that they prefer more the CEO fix compensation than the CEO variable 
compensation, since institutional directors and the CEO variable compensation may be 
substitute. 
 
In Table 6, we report the findings of the hierarchical regression performed to analyse 
the impact of pressure-sensitive and pressure resistant directors sit on boards on CEO 
compensation (total, fix and variable compensation), using eight models. In model 1 and 
2, we analyse the effect of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant, respectively, on the 
CEO total compensation. In the first step of the model 1 and 2, the CEO total 
compensation is regressed on the control variables, in the second step the linear 
SENSIT and RESIST terms are entered in model 1 and 2, respectively, while the non-
linear SENSIT2 and RESIST2 are entered in the third step. The findings evidence that 
pressure-sensitive do not have any effect on the CEO total pay neither linear nor non-
linearly, while pressure-resistant directors behave as institutional directors as a whole, 
impacting negatively on the CEO total compensation up to a certain threshold, beyond 
which the addition of more pressure-resistant directors on boards increases the CEO 
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total pay. Therefore, the hypothesis H2a cannot be accepted, while the hypothesis H2b 
is accepted. Our evidence is consistent with Jara-Bertín et al. (2012), Jiao and Ye (2013) 
and Navissi and Naiker (2006), who report an inverted U shaped association between 
pressure-resistant directors and company value. The findings support the thesis that 
pressure-resistant institutional directors are an effective mechanism in mitigating 
agency problems reducing the CEO total pay, but up to a certain critical value, as the 
incorporation of more pressure-resistant on boards beyond this point will increase the 
CEO total pay, playing an entrenchment role rather than a monitoring role. The lack of a 
significant effect from pressure-sensitive directors on the CEO total compensation could 
be due to several reasons. Firstly, pressure-sensitive directors represent several types of 
institutional investors (e.g. banks and insurance companies), but their aims differ, and 
therefore, their abilities and incentives in relation to monitoring the CEO total 
compensation may not be the same (Shin and Seo, 2011). Secondly, these directors are 
perhaps more interested in matters such as defining corporate strategies and solving 
complexity and uncertainty problems rather than colluding with managers or controlling 
managers. Finally, pressure-sensitive directors might use other corporate governance 
mechanisms different from the CEO total pay to collude or monitor the CEO, 
supporting the idea that corporate governance mechanisms substitute each other 
(Rediker and Seth, 1995). 
 
In model 3 and 4, the effect of pressure-sensitive on the CEO fix and variable 
compensation is analysed, while in model 5 and 6, the impact of pressure-resistant on 
the CEO fix and variable pay is examined. The results find that pressure-sensitive 
directors are associated neither with the fix nor with the variable components of the 
CEO compensation, while pressure-resistant directors on boards impact positively on 
the CEO fix pay, but negatively on the CEO variable compensation, in line with 
institutional directors as a whole. Thus, the hypothesis H2c can partially accepted. 
Therefore, the arguments provided above to justify the preceding findings can be also 
used here. 
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Table 6 
Results of the hierarchical regression for pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional directors sit on the board of directors 
Estimated coefficients. CEO_PAY is the logarithm of the CEO total compensation; FIX_CEO_PAY is the ratio between the total CEO fix compensation and the CEO total compensation; 
VAR_CEO_PAY is the ratio between the total CEO variable compensation and the CEO total compensation; INST is the proportion of institutional directors on board; SENSIT is the proportion 
of the board directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors; RESIST is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-resistant institutional 
investors; WOM is the proportion of women board directors who are representative of institutional investors; BDMEET is the number meetings held by the board in a year; CEO_TENURE is 
the number of years the CEO has held the firm’s higher position; CEO_OWN is the percentage of shares held by CEO; INDP is the proportion of independent directors on board; OWNMAN is 
the proportion of stocks held by directors; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA is the operate income before interests and taxes over total assets and CEO_DUALITY equals to 1 if 
CEO  and president of the board are the same person and 0, otherwise. * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Variables   Model 1 CEO_PAY 
Model 2 
CEO_PAY 
Model 3 
FIX_CEO_PAY 
Model 4 
VAR_CEO_PAY 
 
 Step1 Step2 Step3 Step1 Step2 Step3 Step1 Step2 Step1 Step 2 
Control variables:           
SIZE 0.207*** (0.000) 
0.216*** 
(0.000) 
0.220*** 
(0.000) 
0.207*** 
(0.000) 
0.241*** 
(0.000) 
0.250*** 
(0.000) 
0.032*** 
(0.000) 
0.034*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.021*** 
(0.000) 
ROA -0.119 (0.251) 
-0.115 
(0.271) 
-0.111 
(0.292) 
-0.119 
(0.251) 
-0.103 
(0.345) 
-0.111 
(0.305) 
-0.021 
(0.195) 
-0.021 
(0.227) 
0.013 
(0.102) 
0.013 
(0.130) 
CEO_DUALITY 1.144*** (0.000) 
1.144*** 
(0.000) 
1.136*** 
(0.000) 
1.144*** 
(0.000) 
1.056*** 
(0.000) 
1.041*** 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.514) 
-0.024 
(0.517) 
0.024 
(0.405) 
0.024 
(0.408) 
CEO_TENURE 1.200*** (0.000) 
1.193*** 
(0.000) 
1.194*** 
(0.000) 
1.200*** 
(0.000) 
1.184*** 
(0.000) 
1.180*** 
(0.000) 
-0.039**** 
(0.000) 
-0.041*** 
(0.000) 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
CEO_OWN 0.005 (0.440) 
0.004 
(0.508) 
0.004 
(0.515) 
0.005 
(0.440) 
0.001 
(0.888) 
0.000 
(0.943) 
0.001* 
(0.084) 
0.001 
(0.152) 
-0.002*** 
(0.009) 
-0.001** 
(0.028) 
BDMEET 0.018 (0.449) 
0.017 
(0.491) 
0.015 
(0.536) 
0.018 
(0.449) 
0.034 
(0.180) 
0.036 
(0.154) 
0.007** 
(0.030) 
0.006** 
(0.030) 
-0.002 
(0.346) 
-0.002 
(0.348) 
INDP -1.762*** (0.000) 
-1.877*** 
(0.000) 
-1.882*** 
(0.000) 
-1.762*** 
(0.000) 
-2.493*** 
(0.000) 
-2.497*** 
(0.000) 
0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.305*** 
(0.000) 
-0.124** 
(0.014) 
-0.112** 
(0.014) 
OWNMAN -0.307 (0.403) 
-0.301 
(0.409) 
-0.308 
(0.395) 
-0.307 
(0.403) 
0.039 
(0.917) 
0.093 
(0.804) 
0.364*** 
(0.000) 
0.365*** 
(0.000) 
-0.185*** 
(0.005) 
-0.186*** 
(0.005) 
Linear variable:            
SENSIT                                                                                           
 
RESIST 
 
-0.671 
(0.402) 
 
 
-1.996 
(0.242) 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.317*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
-2.069*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.122 
(0.413) 
 
 
 0.065 
(0.637) 
Non-Linear variable: 
 
    
 
 
    
SENSIT2                                                                   
 
RESIST2 
 
 
 
2.806 
(0.376) 
 
                       
 
         
 
 
 
   
 
0.710*** 
(0.003) 
    
Observations 553 553 553 553 553 553 553 553 553 553 
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F 
R2 
∆R2 
250.63*** 
84.40% 
 
231.41*** 
84.40% 
0.00% 
214.83 
84.40% 
0.00% 
250.63*** 
84.40% 
 
236.91*** 
84.70% 
0.30% 
220.66 
84.80% 
0.10% 
209.33*** 
81.90% 
 
193.27*** 
81.90% 
0.00% 
15.98*** 
24.60% 
14.76*** 
24.50% 
0.90% 
Variables   Model 5 FIX_CEO_PAY 
Model 6 
VAR_CEO_PAY 
 Step1 Step2 Step1 Step2  
Control variables: 
 
   
 
SIZE 
 
0.032*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.001) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.025*** 
(0.000) 
ROA 
 
-0.021 
(0.195) 
-0.026 
(0.124) 
0.013 
(0.102) 
0.015* 
(0.077) 
CEO_DUALITY 
 
-0.024 
(0.514) 
0.001 
(0.984) 
0.024 
(0.405) 
0.014 
(0.638) 
CEO_TENURE 
 
-0.040*** 
(0.000) 
-0.035*** 
(0.000) 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.037*** 
(0.000) 
CEO_OWN 
 
0.001* 
(0.084) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.009) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
BDMEET 
 
0.007** 
(0.030) 
0.002 
(0.410) 
-0.002 
(0.346) 
-0.001 
(0.748) 
INDP 
 
0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.530*** 
(0.000) 
-0.124** 
(0.014) 
-0.198*** 
(0.006) 
OWNMAN 0.364*** (0.000) 
0..268*** 
(0.000) 
-0.185*** 
(0.005) 
-0.150*** 
(0.005) 
 
Linear variable:  
 
    
SENSIT 
 
RESIST 
 
 
 
 
0.366*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
-0.134** 
(0.035) 
 
Observations 
F 
R2 
∆R2 
553 
209.33*** 
81.90% 
553 
204.51 
82.70% 
0.80% 
553 
15.98*** 
24.60% 
553 
15.208*** 
25.10% 
0.50% 
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Endogeneity problems may arise in research such as this (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006). Accordingly, we also analyse the potential endogeneity between institutional 
directors on boards and CEO compensation. Concretely, do these directors lead to 
high/low CEO compensation, or do companies with high/low CEO compensation attract 
institutional directors to their boards?. Though the causality between institutional 
directors and CEO compensation is more likely to go from directors to CEO pay, it is 
also likely that CEO pay could have an effect on board composition. There are 
alternative approaches to address the endogeneity concerns (Li, 2015). Among these 
methods, lagged explanatory variables are used in this analysis to mitigate the possible 
endogeneity problems, in line with Hartzell and Starks (2003), Sasmal and Sasmal 
(2016) and Ozkan (2011). In Table 7, we provide the findings for institutional directors 
on boards, while in Table 8 we offer the results for pressure-sensitive and pressure-
resistant on boards. As can be appreciated in both tables, the findings are consistent 
with our main results, corroborating the results previously shown.  
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Table 7 
Results of the hierarchical regression for institutional directors sit on the board of directors  
Estimated coefficients. CEO_PAY is the logarithm of the CEO total compensation; FIX_CEO_PAY is the ratio between the total CEO fix compensation and the CEO total compensation; 
VAR_CEO_PAY is the ratio between the total CEO variable compensation and the CEO total compensation; INST is the proportion of institutional directors on board; SENSIT is the proportion 
of the board directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors; RESIST is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-resistant institutional 
investors; BDMEET is the number meetings held by the board in a year; CEO_TENURE is the number of years the CEO has held the firm’s higher position; CEO_OWN is the percentage of 
shares held by CEO; INDP is the proportion of independent directors on board; OWNMAN is the proportion of stocks held by directors; SIZE is the logarithm of total assets; ROA is the operate 
income before interests and taxes over total assets and CEO_DUALITY equals to 1 if CEO  and president of the board are the same person and 0, otherwise. * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables   Model 1 CEO_PAY 
Model 2 
FIX_CEO_PAY 
Model 3 
VAR_CEO_PAY 
 Step1 Step2 Step3 Step1 Step2 Step1 Step2 
Control variables: 
 
    
   
SIZE 0.207*** (0.000) 
0.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.286*** 
(0.000) 
0.032*** 
(0.000) 
0.026*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.023*** 
(0.000) 
ROA -0.119 (0.251) 
-0.084 
(0.421) 
-0.070 
(0.537) 
-0.021 
(0.195) 
-0.025* 
(0.085) 
0.013 
(0.102) 
0.014** 
(0.045) 
CEO_DUALITY 
 
1.144*** 
(0.000) 
0.810*** 
(0.001) 
0.695**** 
(0.005) 
-0.024*** 
(0.514) 
-0.014 
(0.709) 
0.024 
(0.405) 
0.021 
(0.389) 
CEO_TENURE 
 
1.200*** 
(0.000) 
1.172*** 
(0.000) 
1.128*** 
(0.000) 
-0.040*** 
(0.000) 
-0.038*** 
(0.000) 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.036*** 
(0.000) 
CEO_OWN 
 
0.005 
(0.440) 
-0.002 
(0.784) 
-0.005 
(0.432) 
0.001* 
(0.084) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.009) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
BDMEET 
 
0.018 
(0.449) 
0.046 
(0.126) 
0.058** 
(0.067) 
0.007** 
(0.030) 
0.003 
(0.318) 
-0.002 
(0.346) 
0.000 
(0.992) 
INDP 
 
-1.761*** 
(0.000) 
-2.459*** 
(0.000) 
-3.120*** 
(0.000) 
0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.487*** 
(0.000) 
-0.124** 
(0.014) 
-0.166*** 
(0.002) 
OWNMAN -0.306 (0.403) 
-0.139 
(0.742) 
0.173 
(0.673) 
0.364*** 
(0.000) 
0274*** 
(0.000) 
-0.185*** 
(0.005) 
-0.127*** 
(0.000) 
Linear variable:         
INST_1 
 
 
-0.948* 
(0.056) 
-2.998*** 
(0.000)  
0.294*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.105*** 
(0.000) 
Non-Linear variable: 
 
    
   
INST2_1 
 
  
0.999*** 
(0.000)  
   
Observations 
F 
R2 
∆R2 
553 
250.63*** 
84.40% 
 
553 
218.37*** 
86.40% 
2.00% 
553 
207.13*** 
86.70% 
2.30% 
553 
209.33*** 
81.90% 
 
553 
371.92*** 
91.50% 
9.60% 
553 
15.98*** 
24.60% 
553 
42.76*** 
54.90% 
30.30% 
 57 
Table 8 
Results of the hierarchical regression for pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional directors sit on the board of directors  
Estimated coefficients. CEO_PAY is the logarithm of the CEO total compensation; FIX_CEO_PAY is the ratio between the total CEO fix compensation and the CEO total compensation; 
VAR_CEO_PAY is the ratio between the total CEO variable compensation and the CEO total compensation; INST is the proportion of institutional directors on board; SENSIT is the proportion 
of the board directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors; RESIST is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-resistant institutional 
investors; BDMEET is the number meetings held by the board in a year; CEO_TENURE is the number of years the CEO has held the firm’s higher position; CEO_OWN is the percentage of 
shares held by CEO; INDP is the proportion of independent directors on board; OWNMAN is the proportion of stocks held by directors; SIZE is the logarithm of total assets; ROA is the operate 
income before interests and taxes over total assets and CEO_DUALITY equals to 1 if CEO  and president of the board are the same person and 0, otherwise. * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Variables   Model 1 CEO_PAY 
Model 2 
CEO_PAY 
Model 3 
FIX_CEO_PAY 
Model 4 
VAR_CEO_PAY 
 
 Step1 Step2 Step3 Step1 Step2 Step3 Step1 Step2 Step1 Step 2 
Control variables: 
 
    
      
SIZE 
 
0.207*** 
(0.000) 
0.201*** 
(0.000) 
0.201*** 
(0.000) 
0.207*** 
(0.000) 
0.217*** 
(0.000) 
0.224*** 
(0.000) 
0.032*** 
(0.000) 
0.036*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.020*** 
(0.000) 
ROA 
 
-0.119 
(0.251) 
-0.100 
(0.319) 
-0.100 
(0.319) 
-0.119 
(0.251) 
-0.090 
(0.388) 
-0.093 
(0.384) 
-0.021 
(0.195) 
-0.019 
(0.262) 
0.013 
(0.102) 
0.013* 
(0.079) 
CEO_DUALITY 
 
1.144*** 
(0.000) 
0.877*** 
(0.000) 
0.877*** 
(0.000) 
1.144*** 
(0.000) 
0.783*** 
(0.001) 
0.770*** 
(0.002) 
-0.024*** 
(0.514) 
-0.034 
(0.348) 
0.024 
(0.405) 
0.029 
(0.242) 
CEO_TENURE 
 
1.200*** 
(0.000) 
1.181*** 
(0.000) 
1.181*** 
(0.000) 
1.200*** 
(0.000) 
1.178*** 
(0.000) 
1.172*** 
(0.000) 
-0.040*** 
(0.000) 
-0.043*** 
(0.000) 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.037*** 
(0.000) 
CEO_OWN 
 
0.005 
(0.440) 
0.001 
(0.849) 
0.001 
(0.848) 
0.005 
(0.440) 
-0.001 
(0.907) 
-0.001 
(0.875) 
0.001* 
(0.084) 
0.002** 
(0.030) 
-0.001*** 
(0.009) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
BDMEET 
 
0.018 
(0.449) 
0.035 
(0.209) 
0.035 
(0.213) 
0.018 
(0.449) 
0.049 
(0.103) 
0.051* 
(0.090) 
0.007** 
(0.030) 
0.006* 
(0.057) 
-0.002 
(0.346) 
-0.001 
(0.603) 
INDP 
 
-1.761*** 
(0.000) 
-1.993*** 
(0.000) 
-1.993*** 
(0.000) 
-1.761*** 
(0.000) 
-2.384*** 
(0.000) 
-2.403*** 
(0.000) 
0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.315*** 
(0.000) 
-0.124** 
(0.014) 
-0.113** 
(0.026) 
OWNMAN -0.306 (0.403) 
-0.396 
(0.325) 
-0.396 
(0.325) 
-0.306 
(0.403) 
-0.093 
(0.823) 
-0.051 
(0.903) 
0.364*** 
(0.000) 
0.352*** 
(0.000) 
-0.185*** 
(0.005) 
-0.155*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-0.625 
(0.452) 
 
 
-0.597 
(0.760) 
 
   
 
0.016 
(0.845) 
  
-0.064 
(0.294) 
Linear variable:  
 
SENSIT_1 
 
RESIST_1 
 
    
-1.036** 
(0.010) 
 
-1.559** 
(0.013) 
 
    
  
 
-0.061 
(0.988) 
 
 
      Non-Linear variable: 
 
SENSIT2_1 
 
RESIST2_1 
 
 
 
   
 0.457* 
(0.076) 
    
Observations 
F 
R2 
∆R2 
553 
250.63*** 
84.40% 
553 
215.20*** 
86.20% 
1.80% 
553 
198.07*** 
86.10% 
-0.10% 
553 
250.63*** 
84.40% 
553 
218.67*** 
86.40% 
2.00% 
553 
201.88*** 
86.40% 
0.00% 
553 
209.33*** 
81.90% 
 
553 
339.37*** 
90.80% 
8.90% 
553 
15.98*** 
24.60% 
553 
41.22*** 
53.90% 
29.30% 
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Variables   Model 5 FIX_CEO_PAY 
Model 6 
VAR_CEO_PAY 
 Step1 Step2 Step1 Step2  
Control variables: 
 
   
 
SIZE 
 
0.032*** 
(0.000) 
0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.021*** 
(0.000) 
ROA -0.021 (0.195) 
-0.023 
(0.144) 
0.013 
(0.102) 
0.013* 
(0.074) 
 
CEO_DUALITY 
-0.024*** 
(0.514) 
-0.007 
(0.840) 
0.024 
(0.405) 
0.022 
(0.396) 
 
CEO_TENURE 
-0.040*** 
(0.000) 
-0.040*** 
(0.000) 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.037*** 
(0.000) 
 
CEO_OWN 
0.001* 
(0.084) 
0.003*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001*** 
(0.009) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
 
BDMEET 
0.007** 
(0.030) 
0.002** 
(0.046) 
-0.002 
(0.346) 
-0.000 
(0.983) 
 
INDP 
0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.453*** 
(0.000) 
-0.124** 
(0.014) 
-0.140*** 
(0.009) 
 
OWNMAN 
 
0.364*** 
(0.000) 
0.266*** 
(0.000) 
-0.185*** 
(0.005) 
-0.132*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
0.298 
(0.000) 
  
 
 
 
-0.079** 
(0.023) 
Linear variable:  
 
SENSIT_1 
 
RESIST_1 
    
Observations 
F 
R2 
∆R2 
 
 
553 
209.33*** 
81.90% 
553 
369.42*** 
91.50% 
9.60% 
553 
15.98*** 
24.60% 
553 
41.92*** 
54.40% 
29.80% 
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1.5.4. Analysis of robustness  
 
We have conducted an analysis of robustness in order to check if there is a linear and 
non-linear relationship between institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant 
directors and the CEO fix and variable compensation. In table 9, the findings of the 
hierarchical regression are provided. In model 1 and 2, we examine whether there is a 
linear and non-linear association between institutional directors and the CEO fix and 
variable compensation, respectively, in model 3 and 4, the same association is analysed 
for pressure-sensitive directors, and the relationship between pressure-resistant directors 
and the CEO fix and variable pay is studied in model 5 and 6, respectively. The findings 
confirm a linear and non-linear association between institutional and pressure-resistant 
directors and the CEO fix and variable compensation, affecting both positive (negative) 
and linearly the CEO fix pay (the CEO variable pay), and negative (positive) and non-
linearly the CEO fix pay (the CEO variable pay). Regarding pressure-sensitive 
directors, the results corroborate that they impact negative (positive) and linearly on the 
CEO fix pay (the CEO variable pay), and positive (negative) and non-linearly on the 
CEO fix compensation (the CEO variable compensation). However, the positive and 
linear association between pressure-sensitive and the CEO variable pay is not 
statistically significant. Therefore, the results corroborate, in general terms, our 
predictions relating to the role played by institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-
resistant directors on boards, concluding that the effect of these directors on the CEO 
total, fix and variable pay is not determined by how CEO pay is measured.  
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Table 9 
Results of the hierarchical regression for institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant directors sit on the board of directors 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables   Model 1 FIX_CEO_PAY 
Model 2 
VAR_CEO_PAY 
Model 3 
FIX_CEO_PAY 
 Step1 Step2 Step3 Step1 Step2 Step3 Step1 Step2 Step3 
Control variables: 
 
    
     
SIZE 
 
0.032*** 
(0.000) 
0.019** 
(0.011) 
0.019 
(0.193) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.027*** 
(0.000) 
0.030*** 
(0.000) 
0.032*** 
(0.000) 
0.034*** 
(0.000) 
0.035*** 
(0.000) 
ROA 
 
-0.021 
(0.195) 
-0.028* 
(0.069) 
-0.029** 
(0.042) 
0.013 
(0.102) 
0.016* 
(0.057) 
0.016** 
(0.048) 
-0.021 
(0.195) 
-0.021 
(0.227) 
-0.019 
(0.298) 
CEO_DUALITY 
 
-0.024 
(0.514) 
-0.006 
(0.878) 
0.010 
(0.783) 
0.024 
(0.405) 
0.017 
(0.562) 
0.013 
(0.668) 
-0.024 
(0.514) 
-0.024 
(0.517) 
-0.027 
(0.442) 
CEO_TENURE 
 
-
0.040*** 
(0.000) 
-0.033*** 
(0.001) 
-0.027*** 
(0.004) 
-0.038*** 
(0.000) 
0.036*** 
(0.000) 
0.034*** 
(0.000) 
-0.040*** 
(0.000) 
-0.041*** 
(0.000) 
-0.041*** 
(0.000) 
CEO_OWN 
 
0.001* 
(0.084) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.009) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.084) 
0.000 
(0.152) 
0.001 
(0.169) 
BDMEET 
 
0.007** 
(0.030) 
0.003 
(0.302) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.346) 
-0.001 
(0.687) 
-0.001 
(0.820) 
0.007** 
(0.030) 
0.006** 
(0.030) 
0.006** 
(0.047) 
INDP 
 
0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.562*** 
(0.000) 
0.676*** 
(0.000) 
-0.125** 
(0.014) 
-0.212*** 
(0.001) 
-0.243*** 
(0.000) 
0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.305*** 
(0.000) 
0.303*** 
(0.000) 
OWNMAN 0.364*** (0.000) 
0.274*** 
(0.000) 
0.225*** 
(0.000) 
-0.185*** 
(0.005) 
-0.152** 
(0.013) 
-0.139** 
(0.022) 
0.364*** 
(0.000) 
0.365*** 
(0.000) 
0.361*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
0.344*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
0.681*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
-0.129*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
-0.220*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Linear variable:  
 
INST 
 
SENSIT 
 
RESIST 
 
    
   -0.122 
(0.413) 
-0.723* 
(0.086) 
  
 
 
-0.176*** 
(0.000) 
 
  
 
0.048** 
(0.013) 
   
Non-Linear variable: 
 
INST2 
 
SENSIT2 
 
RESIST2 
 
    
    1.273** 
(0.042) 
Observations 
F 
R2 
∆R2 
553 
209.33**
* 
81.90% 
 
553 
203.03*** 
82.60% 
0.70% 
553 
192.38*** 
82.90% 
0.30% 
553 
15.98*** 
24.60% 
553 
15.17*** 
25.00% 
0.40% 
553 
14.15*** 
25% 
0.00% 
553 
209.33*** 
81.90% 
 
553 
193.27*** 
81.90% 
0.00% 
553 
180.88*** 
82.00% 
0.10% 
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Variables   Model 4 VAR_CEO_PAY 
Model 5 
FIX_CEO_PAY 
Model 6 
VAR_CEO_PAY 
 Step1 Step2 Step3 Step1 Step2 Step3 Step1 Step2 Step3 
Control variables: 
 
    
     
SIZE 
 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.021*** 
(0.000) 
0.020*** 
(0.000) 
0.032*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.026*** 
(0.000) 
0.026*** 
(0.000) 
ROA 
 
0.013 
(0.102) 
0.013 
(0.130) 
0.011 
(0.208) 
-0.021 
(0.195) 
-0.026 
(0.124) 
-0.025 
(0.146) 
0.013 
(0.102) 
0.015* 
(0.077) 
0.015* 
(0.084) 
CEO_DUALITY 
 
0.024 
(0.405) 
0.024 
(0.408) 
0.027 
(0.327) 
-0.024 
(0.514) 
0.001 
(0.984) 
0.002 
(0.941) 
0.024 
(0.405) 
0.015 
(0.638) 
0.014 
(0.655) 
CEO_TENURE 
 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.038*** 
(0.000) 
-0.040*** 
(0.000) 
-0.035*** 
(0.000) 
-0.035*** 
(0.000) 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.037*** 
(0.000) 
0.037*** 
(0.000) 
CEO_OWN 
 
-0.002*** 
(0.009) 
-0.001** 
(0.028) 
-0.001** 
(0.032) 
0.001* 
(0.084) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.009) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
BDMEET 
 
-0.002 
(0.346) 
-0.002 
(0.348) 
-0.001 
(0.490) 
0.007** 
(0.030) 
0.002 
(0.410) 
0.002 
(0.474) 
-0.002 
(0.346) 
-0.001 
(0.748) 
-0.001 
(0.779) 
INDP 
 
-0.124** 
(0.014) 
-0.113** 
(0.014) 
-0.110** 
(0.015) 
0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.530*** 
(0.000) 
0.530*** 
(0.000) 
-0.124** 
(0.014) 
-0.198*** 
(0.006) 
-0.199*** 
(0.007) 
OWNMAN -0.185*** (0.005) 
-0.186*** 
(0.005) 
-0.183*** 
(0.005) 
0.364*** 
(0.000) 
0.268*** 
(0.000) 
0.260*** 
(0.000) 
-0.185**** 
(0.005) 
-0.150*** 
(0.005) 
-0.148*** 
(0.005) 
Linear variable:           
INST 
 
SENSIT 
 
 
RESIST 
 
 
0.066 
(0.637) 
0.605 
(0.113)  
 
 
 
 
 
0.367*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.471*** 
(0.000) 
  
 
 
 
 
-0.135** 
(0.035) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.165* 
(0.080) 
Non-Linear variable: 
 
    
     
INST2 
 
SENSIT2 
 
 
RESIST2 
 
  
 
-1.144** 
(0.041) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.099** 
(0.018) 
  
 
 
 
0.029 
(0.035) 
Observations 
F 
R2 
∆R2 
553 
15.98*** 
24.60% 
553 
14.76*** 
24.50% 
0.90% 
553 
14.14*** 
25.00% 
0.50% 
553 
209.33*** 
81.90% 
553 
204.51 
82.70% 
0.80% 
553 
190.089 
82.70% 
0.00% 
553 
15.98*** 
24.60% 
553 
15.208*** 
25.10% 
0.50% 
553 
14.109 
25.00% 
-0.10% 
 62 
1.6. CONCLUSION 
 
The fact that compensation policy may affect corporate performance (Gerhart and 
Milkovich, 1990) and that institutional investors are considered to be an active 
mechanism for influencing corporate governance (e.g. Brossard et al., 2013; Gillan and 
Starks, 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), have led to the relationship between 
institutional directors and CEO compensation being analysed by earlier literature (e.g. 
Almazan et al., 2005; Cheng and Firth, 2005; Croci et al, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2003; Ozkan, 2011). The purpose of this research is to study how the presence of 
institutional directors on Spanish boards influences CEO compensation (total, fix and 
variable). First, we have analysed the impact of institutional directors as a whole on 
CEO compensation (total, fix and variable). Next, the institutional directors have been 
classified as pressure-resistant directors and pressure-sensitive directors, according to 
whether they have only an investment relationship with the firm or both a business and 
investment relationship, respectively. Thus, for pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant 
we also conduct the same analysis followed for institutional directors as a whole. 
 
Our results show that institutional directors and pressure-resistant directors on boards 
may perform two opposite roles, depending on the proportion of their representation on 
boards. Institutional and pressure-resistant directors decrease CEO total compensation, 
but when their presence on boards reaches a certain point, they will be more likely to 
support a higher CEO total pay. This association shows a non-linear relationship (U 
shape) between institutional and pressure-resistant directors and the CEO total 
compensation. Opposite to our predictions, pressure-sensitive directors do not affect the 
CEO total compensation neither in a linear nor non-linear way. Concerning CEO’s 
compensation structure (fix and variable), the findings evidence that institutional and 
pressure-resistant directors enhance fix compensation and decrease variable pay, while 
pressure-sensitive directors do not have effect neither on fix nor on variable 
compensation. Thus, these findings suggest that institutional and pressure-resistant 
directors might both play a monitoring role and engage in collusion with the CEO, 
which is associated with the better and worse practices of corporate governance, 
respectively. 
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This research contributes to the growing literature on the role of institutional 
directors in corporate governance in several ways. First, we show that institutional 
directors as a whole affect CEO compensation, but when they are classified in pressure-
resistant and pressure-sensitive institutional directors, the findings show that they do not 
behave in the same manner in relation to the CEO total compensation: pressure-resistant 
directors have an effect and pressure-sensitive directors do not. This evidence supports 
the argument that institutional directors cannot be considered as a uniform group 
(Almazán et al., 2005; Cornett et al., 2007). Thus, the different ways in which pressure-
sensitive and pressure-resistant directors can engage in corporate governance (López-
Iturriaga et al., 2015) is evidenced by this research. Second, our results show that the 
monitoring hypothesis prevails as the presence of institutional and pressure-resistant 
directors on boards increases, but when they reach a certain point, the entrenchment 
hypothesis prevails. Third, the outcomes show a link between boards of directors and 
CEO compensation. Accordingly, compensation is a mechanism for controlling and 
disciplining CEOs. Therefore, institutional and pressure-resistant directors can enhance 
CEO monitoring in a substitutive or complementary manner. Fourth, most research on 
CEO compensation is focused on the US and UK (Conyon et al., 2011; Tosi et al., 
2000). Thus, we extend the analysis to Spain because it is characterized by low legal 
investor protection, a bank-orientated system and one that is based on civil law. 
Therefore, the conclusions of existing research are not applicable to Spain given the 
differences between their corporate governance systems. Finally, this research is 
relevant, on the one hand, because we show the relationship between institutional, 
pressure-sensitive institutional and pressure-resistant institutional directors and CEO 
compensation in the Spanish context, and on the other hand, because we extend a non-
linear association to such relations.  
 
Some implications for the discussion on corporate governance can be drawn from the 
results presented here. Firstly, institutional directors affect corporate governance, 
particularly CEO compensation. However, their impact differs when they are classified 
as pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive directors. Therefore, the type of institutional 
directors must be considered by policymakers when they make recommendations on 
board composition. Secondly, due to the non-linear relationship, whilst a balanced 
proportion of institutional and pressure-resistant directors can reduce CEO pay, a high 
or low percentage of pressure-sensitive directors on boards does not result neither in 
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higher nor in lower CEO compensation. Thus, our findings suggest that pressure-
sensitive directors perhaps perform more of a counselling role rather than a supporting 
or monitoring role. Thirdly, the findings report that independent directors on boards 
improve corporate governance, since their presence reduces CEO pay, in contrast with 
previous research (García-Osma and Gill de Albornoz, 2007), which shows the lack of 
effect of these directors on corporate governance. Accordingly, policymakers should 
pay more attention to the role played by these directors when they suggest board 
composition. Finally, the outcomes point to the potential for a weak corporate 
governance structure to be used by the CEO for his/her own benefit, thereby impairing 
the shareholders’ wealth. 
 
This paper has one limitation. Various factors have been controlled as they may 
affect CEO compensation. Such factors have been selected according to theory and 
earlier empirical research, but it is probable that other unknown features not taken into 
account in this study may influence CEO compensation. 
 
This research could lead to further investigations in the future. First, the creation of 
an appointment and remuneration committee has recently become mandatory by law in 
Spain. Hence, it will be necessary to determine how its composition, particularly in 
terms of institutional directors, influences CEO compensation. Second, most Spanish 
investigations have focused on large firms, but the Spanish economy is characterized by 
smaller and medium-sized companies (SMEs), and thus, how institutional directors 
exert an impact on corporate governance, specifically regarding CEO compensation, is a 
matter requiring further study. Third, it would be also interesting to analyse if the more 
institutional investors a company has, the more reputable/promising a firm is, and 
consequently, the CEOs of these firms receive a compensation premium. Finally, the 
effect on CEO compensation of disentangling cases of percentages of institutional 
directors appointed by one or different institutional investors may also be an engaging 
issue to address.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL DIRECTORS AS A 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM: 
THEIR IMPACT ON CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this chapter, we examine the influence that institutional directors have on corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) issues. First, we consider institutional directors as a whole 
and then classify them as pressure-sensitive or pressure-resistant institutional directors, 
depending not only on whether they represent institutional investors that become 
shareholders of firms, but also if they maintain commercial links with the firms in 
which they have invested. We hypothesize a quadratic relationship between institutional 
directors and CSR. We show a U-shaped relationship between institutional 
directors/pressure-resistant directors and CSR disclosure, showing that they have a 
negative effect on CSR disclosure when their presence on boards is low, but a positive 
influence when their presence on boards is higher than a tipping point, suggesting that 
institutional and pressure-resistant directors may play two opposite roles (monitoring or 
entrenchment with executives) regarding CSR decisions. However, our findings show 
that CSR practices are not affected by pressure-sensitive directors. These findings 
indicate that there is a link between board members – particularly institutional directors 
– and strategic decisions, such as CSR reporting. Moreover, institutional directors do 
not behave in a uniform way as pressure-resistant directors affect CSR disclosure, but 
pressure-sensitive directors do not. Finally, the enhancement of corporate governance 
(increases in CSR disclosure) depends on the proportion of institutional and pressure-
resistant directors on boards.  
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Commission (2001) defines the concept of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) as the integration by firms, on a voluntary basis, of social and 
environmental concerns in their business and in their interaction with their stakeholders. 
The aim of CSR is to promote sustainable development and achieve a triple economic, 
social and environmental impact (Adams and Zutshi, 2004). 
 
A number of issues, including corporate corruption, the use of child labour, 
increasing pollution and malpractice, among others, have led to the rise of CSR as an 
issue of considerable importance. Indeed, the market no longer only considers economic 
performance, but also takes into account social and environmental performance when 
evaluating companies (Setó-Pamies, 2015). Therefore, CSR practices have become a 
key strategic element (Garrigues-Walker and Trullenque, 2008) and companies should 
not only consider economic aims, but also environmental and social goals. 
 
According to Gallego-Álvarez and Quina-Custodio (2016) and Hartojo and Jo 
(2011), a company’s features may influence CSR. Among these characteristics, 
corporate governance is important (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009). Previous literature has 
analysed the relationship between board characteristics and CSR, focusing especially on 
the presence of independent directors (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Hartojo and 
Jo, 2011; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2015; Setó-Pamies, 2015). However, prior research on 
CSR has paid scarcely any attention to the role of other board members, such as 
directors appointed by institutional investors (hereinafter institutional directors). 
 
Institutional investors are the most important controlling shareholders in Europe 
(Brossard et al., 2013), due to the particular agency problem in Europe, where minority 
shareholders’ wealth is appropriated by controlling shareholders, they play a significant 
role on boards as directors. Within European countries, Spain has the highest proportion 
of institutional directors on boards. Concretely, 40% of the board directors are 
appointed by institutional investors (Heidrick and Struggles, 2011). According to prior 
evidence, institutional directors have an effect on board compensation (López-Iturriaga 
et al., 2015), earnings management (García-Osma and Gill de Albornoz, 2007), 
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financial reporting quality (Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014) and leverage 
(García-Meca et al., 2013), among others. 
 
Boards of directors play an important role in corporate governance, affecting CSR 
practices (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013). Therefore, given the role played by institutional 
directors on boards, the relevance of CSR issues to boards’ daily business 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010), the benefits that CSR can provide to companies (e.g. 
Marín et al., 2012; Reverte, 2012) and the scant attention that the relationship between 
corporate governance and CSR has received (Fernández-Sánchez et al., 2011), it is 
necessary to gain an understanding of how institutional directors influence CSR. 
Accordingly, the aim of this research is twofold. First, we analyse the impact of 
institutional directors as a whole on CSR disclosure. Previous evidence suggests that the 
kind of business relations between institutional investors and companies (Brickley et al., 
1988) can explain why institutional directors do not behave in the same way and, 
therefore, their ability, incentives and aims to engage in corporate governance may be 
different (Almazán et al., 2005; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Thus, we also make a 
distinction between pressure-sensitive directors, who represent institutional investors 
maintaining business relations with the firm on the board of which they sit, and 
pressure-resistant directors, who represent institutional investors who do not maintain 
such relations. 
 
Consistent with prior evidence (Almazán et al., 2005; López-Iturriaga et al., 2015), 
our results support the thesis that institutional directors have to be treated as a 
heterogeneous group and not be considered as a whole and that they participate in 
corporate governance in dissimilar ways. In addition, we also show that institutional 
directors as a whole and pressure-resistant directors may perform two opposite roles, 
depending on their representation on boards. Thus, when their representation is low, the 
entrenchment or collusion hypothesis prevails as they are negatively associated with 
CSR reporting and they prefer to collude with executives to meet their own goals. 
However, when their representation on boards exceeds a critical point, they support 
CSR initiatives as the monitoring hypothesis prevails and their monitoring role becomes 
more active and efficient, given that they encourage managers and other directors to 
disclose CSR information. This evidence suggests that the relationship between 
institutional/pressure-resistant directors and CSR disclosure is non-linear, concretely 
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quadratic (U-shaped). In addition, we have constructed an index based on the triple 
bottom line approach to measure CSR disclosure, which includes economic, social and 
environmental matters. This index can be used to assess to what extent a company 
provides CSR information. Finally, from the policymakers’ point of view, this analysis 
makes a significant contribution as it shows that institutional directors behave as drivers 
of good corporate governance and, consequently, policymakers should take them into 
account when recommending or regulating board composition as institutional directors 
may perform two opposite roles with respect to CSR disclosure and are involved in 
corporate governance. 
 
This research makes some contributions to the growing literature on the role of 
institutional directors in corporate governance. The results show a link between the 
mechanisms of corporate governance and strategic decisions. Specifically, we provide 
evidence that the presence of institutional directors on boards is associated with CSR 
reporting, exerting an effect that it is more difficult to find in Anglo-Saxon 
environments because institutional directors appointed by institutional investors are less 
prevalent. We also report that institutional directors do not have the same incentives to 
participate in corporate governance. Thus, when a distinction is made between pressure-
resistant and pressure-sensitive directors, the evidence shows that their attitudes 
concerning CSR reporting is different: whereas pressure-resistant directors affect CSR 
disclosure, pressure-sensitive directors do not.  
 
After this introduction, in the next section we explore the institutional setting within 
which this paper is situated. We, then, describe the theoretical background and the 
hypotheses in the following section before setting out the research design. In a further 
section, we present the results and, finally, we address the conclusions, limitations and 
future research. 
 
2.2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING  
 
According to the European Commission (2013) and the Spanish Government (2014), 
the impetus for the promotion of CSR in the Spanish business sector has been provided 
by the Spanish civil society. Spanish multinationals occupy the top positions in 
international rankings of CSR and sustainability, making Spain the European country 
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with a greater number of multinationals in these rankings (European Commission, 
2013). Furthermore, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are also including and 
enhancing CSR in their activities (Spanish Government, 2014).  
 
Despite CSR being a voluntary matter, both the European Union and Spain have 
driven some initiatives to promote and perform CSR properly. In this regard, in 2001 
the European Commission promoted a CSR framework. To encourage CSR, Spain 
published a White Paper and created the State Council of Corporate Social 
Responsibility. In 2011, the Spanish Government enacted a sustainable economy law to 
turn the Spanish productive model into something more competitive and 
environmentally and socially sustainable. More efforts have also been made by Spanish 
policymakers to encourage CSR, thus achieving sustainable development and 
improving the protection of minority shareholders and transparency. In particular, the 
Conthe Code or Unified Code of Corporate Governance (CUBG) was published in 2006 
and updated in 2015; this proposes the incorporation of CSR practices in businesses. In 
2002, the Spanish Accounting Standard Setting Board published its White Paper for the 
Reform of Accounting in Spain, according to which firms have to include in their 
annual reports environmental information on a compulsory basis and social information 
on a voluntary basis. The Transparency Act (Law 26/2003) was enacted to enhance the 
transparency of Spanish listed firms. Finally, the goal of Law 31/2014 is to attain better 
governance.  
 
Corporate governance is essential to undertake and ensure the proper development of 
CSR (European Commission, 2013). Spain has a non-market-based system, but one that 
is oriented to a banking system. Thus, banks play an important role in economic and 
business development because Spanish capital markets are not as liquid as in the US 
and UK, where their role is significant. Therefore, the corporate control market is not 
very common compared to the US and UK (De Miguel et al., 2004). In addition, 
Spanish corporate governance is distinguished by a high ownership concentration (De 
Andrés et al., 2005), which leads to the presence of controlling shareholders and allows 
them to play a major role on boards and influence managers. Among controlling 
shareholders, the position of institutional investors in Spain is noteworthy and their 
impact on corporate governance is significant (Crespí et al., 2004). Indeed, the 
controlling role in Spanish boards is not played by independent directors, but by 
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directors who represent controlling shareholders, i.e. institutional directors (García-
Osma and Gill de Albornoz, 2007). The level of shareholder protection is low compared 
to the US and UK (La Porta et al., 1998). As a result, the board of directors is one of the 
most important mechanisms for alleviating agency costs characterized by the 
expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth by controlling shareholders. 
 
Consequently, the analysis of the effect of institutional directors on CSR in the 
Spanish context is important as the board is one of the main bodies making decisions 
and alleviating agency problems. Thus, given the importance that CSR has acquired in 
Spain for sustainable development, it is essential to examine such relationships. 
Furthermore, independent directors on boards do not act independently (Spencer Stuart, 
2015), this role being played instead by institutional directors, who may be considered 
outsiders and more independent of management. In addition, in examining institutional 
investors, most prior research has focused on their roles as shareholders and not as 
directors (e.g. Cox et al., 2004; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-
Martín, 2011) and the majority of the previous literature on CSR has been based on the 
US and UK (Miras-Rodríguez et al., 2014).  
 
2.3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Maximizing benefits has been the sole aim pursued by owners (Friedman, 1962). 
However, according to stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), companies should not only 
consider owners’ interests, but also those of all stakeholders as they can influence or can 
be influenced by the company. Thus, the relationships between managers and decisive 
stakeholders are essential in creating sustainable long-term value (Freeman, 1984; Post 
et al., 2002). The triple bottom line (TBL), based on stakeholder theory, offers a wider 
view of the stakeholders affected by firms. The TBL framework has been adopted by 
many companies to evaluate their performance from a broader perspective and, thus, 
create greater business value (Elkington, 1994). Accordingly, the three components that 
make up the TBL – social, environmental and financial – are considered to assess firm 
performance. Furthermore, these three components are connected and the performance 
in one component affects the other two and vice versa (Hockerts, 1999). Thus, this 
approach adds social and environmental measures of performance (Gao and Zhang, 
2006) and, therefore, companies are not only responsible for economic aspects. 
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Consequently, the ultimate goal of firms is not to generate wealth for their shareholders, 
but also to create social and environmental value (Elkington, 1997), extending the 
benefits not only to shareholders, but also to all stakeholders.  
 
Firms can gain competitive advantage and garner greater financial benefits through 
engaging in CSR activities (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006) as these activities make it 
possible to manage social and environmental risks and avoid stringent regulation 
(Maxwell et al., 2000) and negative customer reactions (Baron 2001). This may reduce 
the firm’s market risk (Salama et al., 2011), reduce the cost of financing (Lenox and 
Nash, 2003; Reverte, 2012) and lower the uncertainty of cash flow. In addition, CSR 
practices may enhance job satisfaction and mitigate recruitment and training costs 
(Branco and Rodriges, 2006; Zappala, 2004). Moreover, CSR may generate entry 
barriers to the industry, easing access to new markets (Wotruba, 1997) and enhancing 
the firm’s reputation (Diller, 1999) and competitiveness (Marín et al., 2012). In this 
line, previous research has found a positive relationship between CSR and financial 
performance (e.g. Jimeno de la Maza and Redondo-Cristóbal, 2011; McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001).  
 
Thus, CSR is part of the corporate strategy for developing competitive advantage 
(Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010) and is considered a strategic investment (e.g. Husted 
and Allen, 2000; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Consequently, boards are increasingly 
making decisions concerning CSR (Ingley, 2008). Hence, boards not only have to focus 
on economic performance, but have to extend their aims and consider social and 
environmental performance as well, creating value for stakeholders and being 
responsible towards them and not only towards owners. 
 
Boards exert significant influence on the responsible behaviour of firms (Michelon 
and Parbonetti, 2012; Rupley et al., 2012) and, consequently, corporate governance is a 
relevant mechanism for guaranteeing CSR practices (European Commission, 2013). 
Thus, board composition may play an essential role in CSR policies (Pfeffer, 1972). 
Although CUBG (2006) recommended the presence of independent directors on boards 
to improve corporate governance, research has shown that they do not enhance it 
(Menozzi et al., 2011; Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014) and do not affect CSR 
activities (McKendall et al., 1999). Indeed, some authors (García-Osma and Gill de 
 74 
Albornoz, 2007; Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014) suggest that corporate 
governance is enhanced by institutional directors and not by independent directors. 
Thus, the role played by institutional directors on boards with regard to CSR practices is 
an interesting topic for analysis.  
 
Some theories suggest a positive impact of institutional directors on CSR practices. 
Among these, stewardship theory is frequently used to understand the implications of 
the presence of institutional directors for company strategy (Castaldi and Wortman, 
1984) as it stresses the experience, knowledge and skill of directors. The rising belief 
that CSR activities enhance financial performance has put social and environmental 
issues on firms’ agenda. Hence, institutional directors are expected to foster CSR 
practices because they focus on social and environmental issues as well as financial 
performance. In addition, they are interested in showing the responsible behaviour of 
the company as otherwise their professional reputation can be harmed (Pathan, 2009). 
Stakeholder power theory shows that firms are likely to meet the requests of 
stakeholders who control critical resources (Ullman, 1985). Therefore, outside directors, 
such as institutional directors, may be more aware of CSR activities than executives, 
who are more concerned with economic questions. According to resource dependence 
theory, the board of directors is a necessary body to manage outside dependencies, such 
as those imposed by social and environmental challenges (Hillman et al., 2000). This 
theory suggests that outside directors, such as institutional directors, are an effective 
tool to connect the firm with its external environment. Finally, agency theory posits that 
institutional directors who are committed to CSR issues may strengthen the internal 
control of firms. Therefore, they may reduce opportunistic behaviour problems due to 
asymmetric information (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013), disclosing social and 
environmental information. 
 
According to myopic institutional theory (Hansen and Hill, 1991), institutional 
investors, represented on boards by institutional directors, tend to be short-sighted and 
focus on returns. This argument is in line with the thesis that institutional investors will 
not support CSR investment decisions, given the long-term horizons and uncertain 
results associated with them (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991). However, institutional 
investors usually own a large proportion of shares (Ozkan, 2007), making it 
complicated and costly to sell off their shares without negatively affecting the stock 
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price. Furthermore, institutional investors hold stock in most companies and, 
consequently, may have difficulty in finding other suitable investments. Finally, 
institutional investors manage money from other people and, accordingly, have to 
protect their investment against loss of value. As a result, representatives of institutional 
investors, institutional directors, have sufficient incentives to perform monitoring 
activities (Gillan and Starks, 2000), which implies both collecting and analysing 
information and influencing management, as well as being involved in the strategic 
decisions of firms (McWilliam and Siegel, 2001), such as CSR decisions. 
 
In addition, Spicer (1978) and Graves and Waddock (1994) suggest that institutional 
directors consider firms which do not behave responsibly to be more risky and 
potentially less efficient. Moreover, these directors view CSR as essential to attain 
sustainability and competitive advantage (Neubaum and Zahra, 2006), as in changing 
and unpredictable environments socially responsible behaviour can help firms gain 
legitimacy through support from different stakeholders (Goll and Rashedd, 2004). Thus, 
institutional directors, as dominant shareholders’ representatives, have an interest in the 
long-term sustainability of the company (Paek et al., 213) and they are likely to support 
CSR activities because they are necessary for long-term value creation and sustainable 
organizational performance (Mahapatra, 1984). In this line, previous research has found 
a positive relationship between outside directors, such as institutional directors, and 
CSR policies (e.g. Ibrahim et al., 2003; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Webb, 2004; 
Zahra et al., 1993). These same results are reported by Dyck et al. (2015), Fernández 
Sánchez et al. (2011), Johnson and Greening (1999), Neubaum and Zahra (2006) and 
Yong Oh and Kyun Chang (2011), who show a positive impact of institutional investors 
on CSR practices, demonstrating the effectiveness of these owners in promoting 
responsible behaviour. 
 
However, although institutional directors are active and vigilant investors and, 
therefore, may encourage CSR activities (Preston and Post, 1975; Useem, 1996), 
monitoring is extremely costly. As the cost of monitoring activities is borne by 
institutional investors and all stakeholders benefit from them (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986), these investors can bear potential liquidity costs (Coffee, 1991) and free-rider 
problems can arise. Consequently, institutional directors have to determine the benefit–
cost ratio of monitoring activities and the intensity of monitoring will vary depending 
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on the value of this ratio (Almazán et al., 2005). In addition, institutional directors have 
the power to make decisions based on their own benefits, (Cornett et al., 2007; Ruiz-
Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2009) and tend to deal personally with firms (Carleton et 
al., 1998) to achieve their own goals (Pound, 1988). Accordingly, it is reasonable to 
suggest that institutional directors may take part in tunnelling activities, namely 
expropriating wealth from minority owners (Johnson et al., 2000), instead of performing 
control activities. As a result, institutional directors may negatively influence CSR 
activities, despite the potential for CSR practices to increase firm performance, as they 
may hope to derive lower profits due to the wedge between cash flow and control rights 
(Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2016). Thus, authors such as Arora and 
Dhawadkar (2011), Coffey and Fryxell (1991) and Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca 
(2016) find a negative influence of institutional directors on CSR policies. 
 
Thus, the prior literature shows a linear relationship between institutional directors 
and CSR. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no existing evidence of a non-
linear relationship, concretely quadratic, between institutional directors and CSR 
activities, while authors such as Chirinko et al. (1999), Jara-Bertin et al. (2012), Navissi 
and Naiker (2006) and Zou (2010) show this quadratic non-linear association between 
institutional investors and firm performance. Therefore, we extend this quadratic 
relationship to institutional directors and CSR practices.  
 
This quadratic relationship is supported by the theory of optimal distinctiveness 
proposed by Brewer (1991). According to this approach, the effect of a collective is 
expected to be non-linear: the presence of features (institutional directors) at very low 
and very high levels within a team (board of directors) can lead to more positive results 
(more CSR practices), while more negative outcomes (fewer CSR practices) can take 
arise when there is a balanced proportion of features (a U-shaped relationship). 
Therefore, focusing on these arguments, it can be suggested that institutional directors 
not only have a linear effect on CSR practices, but also a non-linear effect.  
 
Thus, we expect a non-linear association, concretely quadratic, between institutional 
directors on boards and CSR activities. On the one hand, we hypothesize that as the 
proportion of institutional directors increases, they will prefer to collude and entrench 
with managers in order to obtain private benefits given the high costs of both 
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monitoring and challenging the management team to adopt CSR activities; 
consequently, they will align with managers’ decisions rather than supporting CSR 
practices. Institutional directors will be less likely to wish to bear more monitoring costs 
and, as a result, they will have fewer incentives to push managers to perform CSR 
activities. When their presence represents low percentages on boards, it is easier for 
them to collude with mangers. In this line, Oh et al. (2011) report that executives have a 
negative impact on CSR practices, showing that managers are more interested in 
financial performance than CSR activities. This is because managers may perceive CSR 
activities as an extra cost and consider that they do not create firm value. Therefore, 
they may not consider social and environmental issues to be key factors in their 
oversight and strategic planning responsibilities. Accordingly, managers may deal with 
institutional directors in order to obtain their support and, in exchange, institutional 
directors may fulfil their own aims. Furthermore, according to Ricart et al. (2005), more 
than 50% of board members do not perceive CSR to be a key issue and the views of a 
low proportion of institutional directors wishing to promote CSR policies may, 
therefore, not be considered.  
 
Nevertheless, when their presence on boards reaches a certain threshold, institutional 
directors may have a positive effect on CSR activities, in line with the monitoring 
hypothesis. Thus, the addition of more institutional directors on boards above this 
inflection point will concentrate a higher proportion of institutional directors, who may 
share monitoring costs. Their monitoring role will, therefore, be more efficient and it 
will be more difficult for managers to collude with all institutional directors. Moreover, 
the presence of more institutional directors on boards will militate against other 
institutional directors taking part in tunnelling activities. Accordingly, it is more likely 
that institutional directors will perform monitoring activities, avoid expropriation 
activities and challenge boards and management team to implement CSR strategies, 
viewing the benefits of CSR as essential to achieve competitive advantage, which leads 
to the long-term sustainability of the firm and enhances firm value. Therefore, there can 
be two opposite impacts on CSR from the presence of institutional directors, suggesting 
a non-linear association between them and CSR practices, concretely a quadratic 
relationship (a U-shaped relationship).  
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Based on the above, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Institutional directors have a negative effect on CSR reporting, but when 
they exceed a critical point, they affect them positively.  
 
However, prior research provides evidence that institutional directors do not behave 
in a monolithic manner with regard to corporate issues (e.g. Almazán et al., 2005; 
Ferreira and Matos, 2008, Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014; Ramalingegowda 
and Yu, 2012) as there are differences between the legal, competitive and regulatory 
environments they face (Bennett et al., 2013). Indeed, institutional directors are a 
heterogeneous group with diverse incentives for engagement in corporate governance. 
Business relationships are considered as a key factor that may influence the 
effectiveness of control by institutional directors, affecting their capability to perform 
monitoring activities and the extent of their influence (Brickley et al., 1988). 
Accordingly, institutional directors can be categorized as either pressure-resistant 
institutional directors or pressure-sensitive institutional directors (e.g. Almazán et al., 
2005; López-Iturriaga et al., 2015; Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2009). 
 
Pressure-resistant investors, represented by pressure-resistant directors, including 
mutual funds, pension funds, investment funds, venture capital firms and endowments, 
solely maintain an investment relationship with the company in which they invest. 
Thus, they do not incur conflicts of interest arising from business ties, the pressure from 
the company in which they invest is lower and, consequently, they can behave more 
independently (David et al., 2001). Hence, pressure-resistant directors may be more 
active in monitoring and may exert pressure to encourage change (e.g. Almazán et al., 
2005; Ferrerira and Matos; 2008; Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2014), such as 
engaging in CSR practices. Moreover, these directors prefer to invest over a long-term 
horizon (Tihanyi et al., 2003) and to reduce agency problems, performing monitoring 
activities to mitigate or eliminate fraudulent behaviour (Zhang et al., 2008). Thus, they 
will be more active in monitoring managers and may affect firm decisions in line with 
stakeholders’ interests, supporting CSR activities and increasing the disclosure of 
environmental and social issues. Johnson and Greening (1999) show a positive 
relationship between pressure-resistant institutional ownership and CSR. Sethi (2005) 
also provides evidence that CSR is influenced positively by pressure-resistant 
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institutional investors. Similarly, Cox et al. (2004), Harjoto and Jo (2008) and Neubaum 
and Zahra (2006) find that pressure-resistant institutional investors are positively 
associated with CSR. Hence, it is likely that pressure-resistant institutional directors will 
enhance CSR reporting owing to their monitoring role.  
 
However, as pointed out above, authors like Jara-Bertín et al. (2012) and Navissi and 
Naiker (2006) find a non-linear relationship between institutional directors and firm 
value. Extending this association to pressure-resistant institutional directors, Jiao and 
Ye (2013) show a quadratic relationship between pressure-resistant institutional 
directors and firms’ future performance. Consequently, we extend this non-linear 
relationship to the analysis of the presence of pressure-resistant institutional directors 
and CSR practices. Therefore, as posited for institutional directors as a whole, we 
propose that when the presence of pressure-resistant institutional directors is low, their 
position may not be considered when trying to enhance CSR practices as most of the 
board members do not consider CSR an essential matter (Ricart et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, when their presence on boards is low, their incentives to perform 
monitoring activities will be lower because they bear more monitoring costs and, as a 
result, they will be less likely to challenge managers to undertake CSR activities. In 
addition, it is also more likely that pressure-resistant directors will take part in 
tunnelling activities because executives may collude with them to obtain their support; 
in exchange, these directors may achieve fulfilment of their own interests. Conversely, 
as the proportion of pressure-resistant directors on boards grows, they may monitor 
management team more effectively as they can share monitoring costs. When their 
presence on boards reaches a certain point, it will be more difficult for managers to 
attain the support of pressure-resistant directors. Thus, the greater the presence of 
pressure-resistant directors on the board the more likely it is that they will perform 
monitoring activities, militating against other pressure-resistant directors taking part in 
expropriation activities and challenging boards to implement a CSR strategy as the 
benefits of this strategy are considered important for attaining long-term sustainability 
and enhancing company performance. These arguments support a non-linear association 
between pressure-resistant directors and CSR practices (a U-shaped relationship).  
 
On the other hand, pressure-sensitive investors, which include banks and insurance 
companies, have both an investment and business relationship with the firm in which 
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their representatives, pressure-sensitive directors, serve on boards. Pressure-sensitive 
investors, particularly banks, are entities with high public visibility (Khan, 2010). They 
can act as creditors and shareholders and, as a result, society may press these investors 
to increase CSR activities (Simpson and Kohers, 2002) in the firms in which their 
representatives serve on boards in order to avoid unsafe products or polluting the 
environment. Accordingly – and given the importance of CSR in recent years – 
pressure-sensitive investors have directed their activities towards engaging in socially 
responsible behaviour to meet the expectations of a wider group of stakeholders 
(O’Donnovan, 2002). In this line, banks have increased their CSR activities (Douglas et 
al., 2004; Sharif and Rashid, 2014). To avoid damaging their professional reputation, 
pressure-sensitive directors are more willing to assess firms’ social aims (Zahra, 1989) 
and confirm that the firms’ behaviour is socially responsible in accordance with these 
aims (García-Sánchez et al., 2011).  
 
Moreover, banks perform a triple role, as shareholders, creditors and directors. This 
position gives them more information, reduces information asymmetry (Hadlock and 
James, 2002) and makes them more efficient monitors (Gorton and Schmid, 2000; 
Ingley and Van Der Walt, 2004) as their knowledge of the firms, obtained through their 
relationships, allows pressure-sensitive directors to supervise firms’ investments and 
mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems (García-Meca et al., 2013; 
Hadlock and James, 2002). Furthermore, pressure-sensitive directors may also act as 
creditors and, therefore, they may be interested primarily in the viability of the company 
and paying off debt. Thus, pressure-sensitive directors may support CSR activities as 
they can improve internal control systems, enable better decision making and save costs 
(Adams, 2002), resulting in lower firm risk. In this way, increasing CSR activities will 
allow pressure-sensitive investors to lessen the risk faced by lenders and to lower the 
probability of default, thereby protecting their loans. 
 
In addition, banks reduce their opportunistic behaviour when they behave as both 
shareholders and creditors (De Andrés Alonso et al., 2010; Mahrt-Smith, 2006), as a 
result of which they may perform an active role in the governance of the firm (García-
Meca et al., 2013). Consequently, pressure-sensitive directors may play an active and 
effective monitoring role and will tend to align their representatives’ interests with those 
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of other shareholders, trying to guarantee management involvement in CSR activities 
(Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2016). 
 
However, authors like De Andrés et al. (2010) and Morck et al. (2000) show a non-
linear association between pressure-sensitive institutional ownership and corporate 
performance. We would like to extend the analysis of this relationship and examine 
whether a non-linear association is confirmed between pressure-sensitive institutional 
directors and CSR.  
 
Drawing on the above arguments, we predict that as the presence of pressure-
sensitive directors on boards increases, they will challenge boards and managers to 
undertake CSR activities as their monitoring role may be more active and effective than 
that of other directors due to their triple role as shareholders, creditors and directors. 
Thus, pressure-sensitive directors have more information which they might use to press 
boards to make decisions in line with higher CSR disclosure. In addition, this CSR 
reporting may be promoted by pressure-sensitive directors because they tend to consider 
not only their own interests, but also those of other stakeholders. However, when their 
presence on boards reaches a tipping point, the incorporation of more pressure-sensitive 
directors will result in them playing a less effective and weaker monitoring role due to 
their commercial ties (Brickley et al., 1988). This will, then, affect corporate decisions 
as each pressure-sensitive investor will tend to enforce their own interests at the expense 
of other pressure-sensitive investors; their aim will not be to boost corporate value, but 
to obtain private profits (Cuervo, 2002) and control other pressure-sensitive investors 
with the purpose of hindering them from fulfilling their own aims. Consequently, 
pressure-sensitive directors will be likely to give more support to managers and less 
willing to challenge them with regard to CSR practices due to the interest disputes 
pressure-sensitive institutional investors have to contend with arising from their 
commercial ties (Almazán et al., 2005). Otherwise, they may compromise their business 
relations (Chen et al., 2007). 
 
In addition, the monitoring costs are higher for pressure-sensitive directors than for 
pressure-resistant directors (Almazán et al., 2005) and, therefore, when the presence of 
pressure-sensitive directors on boards is high, they may not have the incentives and 
abilities to control managers; if they do so, they might endanger their opportunities to 
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obtain private benefits in favour of other pressure-sensitive directors who support 
managers’ decisions. Hence, pressure-sensitive directors may choose not to control 
managers, but to favour their decisions (Brickley et al., 1988), for example limiting 
CSR activities. This would be in line with research which has shown that when 
pressure-sensitive directors make corporate decisions, they are contrary to shareholders’ 
interests (Brickley et al., 1988; Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2011; Tribó and 
Casasola, 2010). Thus, pressure-sensitive directors might collude with managers, 
supporting their decisions, such as not being involved in CSR practices, to attain their 
own aims and avoid jeopardizing business ties. Moreover, according to Bushee (1998), 
these directors prefer short-term earnings, so pressure-sensitive directors might 
encourage firms to assume activities that enhance short-term profitability (Hoskisson et 
al., 2002) and discourage CSR practices, the benefits of which are derived over the long 
term (Johnson and Greening, 1999). Thus, given the monitoring costs and the conflicts 
of interest pressure-sensitive directors face and their short-term orientation, it is likely 
that they will not support CSR activities, suggesting a negative association between 
pressure-sensitive institutional directors and CSR practices. Therefore, an inverted U-
shaped relationship between pressure-sensitive directors and CSR may be expected, in 
which the monitoring hypothesis prevails with low numbers of pressure-sensitive 
directors and CSR activities are supported due to their controlling role, but the collusion 
hypothesis is supported with high numbers of pressure-sensitive directors as they may 
collude with managers to safeguard their business and, hence, may not support CSR 
activities. 
 
Accordingly, we hypothesize a non-linear relationship between pressure-sensitive 
directors and CSR activities: as the proportion of pressure-sensitive directors increases 
on boards, they will perform an active monitoring role to avoid negative and 
opportunistic disclosures and will support those that benefit a broad range of 
stakeholders, for example supporting CSR reporting. Nevertheless, when the presence 
of pressure-sensitive directors on boards exceeds a critical point, their aim might be to 
collude with managers and to support managers’ decisions, such as reducing CSR 
activities in order to obtain private benefits. In return, managers will provide benefits to 
those pressure-sensitive directors who do not hinder their decisions, such as limiting 
CSR. 
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To the best of our knowledge, a non-linear association between pressure-
resistant/pressure-sensitive institutional directors and CSR has not yet been analysed.  
 
Thus, according to the above views, we propose the following two hypotheses: 
 
H2a: Pressure-resistant directors have a negative effect on CSR reporting, but 
when they reach a critical point, they affect them positively.  
 
H2b: Pressure-sensitive directors have a positive effect on CSR reporting, but 
when they reach a critical point, they affect them negatively.  
 
 
2.4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
2.4.1 Sample 
 
The database used in this research was drawn from the population of Spanish non-
financial listed companies for the period 2007–2014. Both financial and insurance firms 
were removed from the sample due to their particular accounting practices, which make 
their financial statements incomparable with those of firms in other sectors. An 
unbalanced panel, consisting of 864 firm-year observations, was constructed. The 
findings provided for such panels are as reliable as those achieved by balanced panels 
(Arellano, 2003). 
 
Financial data were collected from the “Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos” 
(SABI database) and corporate governance information was obtained from the public 
register of the Spanish Securities Market Commission (CNMV), particularly from the 
annual corporate governance reports. Finally, CSR data were collected from both the 
companies’ websites and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) website, as the GRI is 
the most significant framework for disclosing CSR issues with regard to economic, 
social and environmental performance (Gallego, 2006). 
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2.4.2. Variables 
 
We use two different variables as dependent variables. We define the first as 
REPORT, measured as a dummy variable coded 1 if the company discloses a CSR 
report and 0, otherwise (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013). The second dependent variable is 
defined as CSR. To measure this variable, we built a CSR index based on the triple 
bottom line approach, which includes economic, social and environmental performance 
(Bansal, 2005; Chow and Chen, 2012; Gallardo-Vázquez et al., 2013; Gallego, 2006; 
Gónzález-Ramos et al., 2014). This index was constructed through content analysis of 
the CSR reports (Dong et al., 2014; Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013; Kuo et al., 2012; Miras-
Rodríguez et al., 2014). Specifically, we used an aggregate construct calculated as the 
aggregation of 25 items measured as dummy variables, assigning each item the value 1 
if the firm provides information concerning the item considered and 0, otherwise (Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Hughes et al., 2001; Miras-Rodríguez, 2014). The selection of the 
25 items was based on investigations conducted in Spain (Archel-Domench, 2003; 
Gallardo-Vázquez et al., 2013; Gallego, 2006; González-Ramos et al., 2014) as our 
study is also based in this context and, therefore, both the legal and cultural 
environments should be taken into account; they influence CSR practices and CSR 
disclosure (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Miras-Rodríguez et al., 2015; Prado and 
Garcia, 2011; Yong, A., 2008). The index value for each company is estimated as 
follows:  
 
RSCit=∑ item pointsit/total points (25 points) 
 
In Table 1, we offer the items considered in the CSR index. 
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Table 1 
Items considered in the CSR index 
Social dimension 
1. Hiring people at risk of social exclusion 
2. Commitment to job creation 
3. Training and professional development of employees 
4. Flexible labour policies for reconciling work and family life 
5. Consideration of employees’ proposals in the management decisions of the company 
6. Information on accidents and absenteeism 
7. Money earmarked for political parties 
8. Investments in social programmes 
9. Awards and/or mentions received related to social, ethical and environmental 
performance 
Economic dimension 
1. Geographical distribution of markets 
2. Geographical distribution of suppliers 
3. Information on responsible purchasing 
4. Information on enhancing stable relations, cooperation and mutual benefit with 
suppliers 
5. Information on non-compliance with the terms agreed with suppliers 
6. Complete and accurate information about the products and/or services delivered to 
customers 
7. Information on customer complaints 
8. Taxes paid to the government by country 
Environmental dimension 
1. Information on energy, water, etc. 
2. Information on the use of renewable energy sources 
3. Information on waste generation and emissions 
4. Information on the use of waste as inputs for the production process 
5. Information on the use of consumables, work in progress products/processed, 
packaging of low environmental impact 
6. Information on the commitment to reducing the negative impact of the final product on 
the environment 
7. Incidents/fines related to the environment 
8. Investment in environmental programmes 
 
The CSR index is in the range (0–1), based on the classification provided in Table 2: 
 
Table 2 
CSR classification  
Index Score Classification 
0 Firm does not disclose CSR information concerning the items analysed 
0.1–0.5 The CSR disclosure of the firm is moderate 
0.6–0.9 The CSR disclosure of the firm is considerable 
1 The CSR disclosure of the firm concerning the items analysed is complete 
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To test how institutional directors influence CSR, several independent variables are 
used. The variable PINST represents the institutional directors on boards appointed by 
institutional investors, measured as the proportion of institutional directors on boards 
(García-Meca and Pucheta-Martínez, 2015; López-Iturriaga et al., 2015; Pucheta-
Martínez and García-Meca, 2016). The variables PSENSIT and PRESIST represent the 
proportion of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant directors on boards, respectively. 
Both PSENSIT and PRESIST are the quotient of the total number of pressure-
sensitive/pressure-resistant directors on boards, respectively, and the total number of 
members on boards (García-Meca et al., 2013; López-Iturriaga et al., 2015; Pucheta-
Martínez and García-Meca, 2014). Finally, the squares of the proportions of 
institutional (PINST2), pressure-sensitive (PSENSIT2) and pressure-resistant directors 
(PRESIST2) are used to analyse whether these directors affect CSR in a quadratic 
manner.  
 
Other factors may have effect on CSR and, therefore, several variables have been 
taken into account. First, firm size is considered, defined as FSIZE and measured as the 
log of total assets (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013; Victoravich et al., 2013). Previous 
research has shown a positive relationship between firm size and CSR (e.g. Archel-
Domenech, 2003; Gallego-Álvarez and Quina-Custodio 2016; Hamid, 2004). Firm 
performance is defined as ROA and is measured as operating income before interest and 
taxes over total assets (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008). A positive association 
between firm performance and CSR has been shown by previous research (e.g. Pucheta-
Martínez and García-Meca, 2016; Setó-Pamies, 2015). Leverage is also controlled, 
defined as LEV and measured as the ratio between the volume of the firm’s short- and 
long-term debt and its total assets (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Fernández-Gago et al., 
2014). A negative correlation is shown by Castelo and Lima (2008) and Reverte (2009) 
between leverage and CSR reporting. Board size is also controlled, defined as BDSIZE 
and measured as the number of directors on boards (Kent and Ung, 2003; Martínez-
Ferrero et al., 2015; Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2016). A positive correlation is 
expected between board size and CSR (Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2015; Pucheta-Martínez 
and García-Meca, 2016). Board independence has been found to increase CSR activities 
(e.g. Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2015; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009). 
Hence, we also control board independence, labelled as INDP and calculated as the 
proportion of independent directors on boards (Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2015; Prado-
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Lorenzo et al., 2009; Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 2016). A dual position as 
CEO and president of the board of directors, defined as CEO_DUALITY, is also 
considered. This variable is calculated as a binary variable coded 1 if the CEO serves as 
CEO and chairman of the board and 0, otherwise (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009). A 
negative association is expected between this variable and CSR activities. Finally, board 
activity is also considered as a control variable, defined as BDMEET and measured as 
the number of meetings held by the board (Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2015; Prado-Lorenzo 
et al., 2009). It is expected that the more meetings held by the board, the more effective 
will be its controlling role and this may increase CSR activity. Finally, the sector to 
which the company belongs is also considered. The sector will affect CSR activities 
(Fernández-Gago et al., 2014; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009) and the companies that 
belong to highly sensitive sectors are more likely to disclose CSR information (Deegan 
and Gordon, 1996). Thus – and according to the Madrid Stock Exchange sector 
classification – we use three sector variables, defined as SECT_OE, SECT_IC and 
SECT_CO and measured as a dummy variable coded 1 if the company belongs to the 
oil and energy sector, the basic materials, industry and construction sector and the 
consumer services sector respectively and 0, otherwise.  
 
A summary of the description of variables is provided in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Variable description 
Variables Expected Sign Description 
REPORT  Dummy variable. 1 if the firm discloses CSR report and 0, otherwise 
CSR  CSR index 
PINST - The proportion of institutional directors on the board 
PINST2 + The square of PINST 
PSENSIT + The proportion of institutional directors who represent pressure-sensitive institutional investors on the board  
PSENSIT2 - The square of PSENSIT 
PRESIST - The proportion of institutional directors who represent pressure-resistant institutional investors on the board  
PRESIST2 + The square of PRESIST 
FSIZE + The logarithm of total assets 
ROA + Operating incomes before interests and taxes over total 
assets 
LEV - The ration between the fim’s debt and its total assets 
BDSIZE + The number of directors on board 
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CEO_DUALITY - Dummy variable. 1 if the CEO and president of the board are the same and 0, otherwise 
BDMEET + The number of meetings held by the board in a year. 
INDP + The proportion of independent directors on the board 
SECT_OE + Dummy variable. 1 if the firm belongs to the oil and 
energy sector and 0, otherwise 
SECT_IC + 
Dummy variable. 1 if the firm belongs to the basic 
materials, industry and construction sector and 0, 
otherwise 
SECT_CO + Dummy variable. 1 if the firm belongs to the consumer 
services sector and 0, otherwise 
 
 
2.4.3. Methodology 
 
The following models are estimated to examine the hypotheses:  
 
REPORTit = α + ∑ Βj BOARD_DIRECTORSit + ∑ Βj BOARD_DIRECTORS2it 
+ β7 FSIZE it + β8 ROAit + β9 LEVit + β10 CEO_DUALITYit + β11 BDMEETit + β12 
INDPit + β13 BDSIZEit + ∑ Βj SECTit + µ it + εit     (1) 
 
CSRit = α + ∑ Βj BOARD_DIRECTORSit + ∑ Βj BOARD_DIRECTORS2it + β7 
FSIZE it + β8 ROAit + β9 LEVit + β10 CEO_DUALITYit + β11 BDMEETit + β12 INDPit + 
β13 BDSIZEit + ∑ Βj SECTit + µ it + εit      (2) 
 
Where BOARD_DIRECTORSit denotes institutional, pressure-sensitive and 
pressure-resistant directors. In addition, µ it represents year-fixed and firm-fixed effects 
and εit is the error term. Firm-fixed effects capture unobservable and constant features of 
the companies which are potentially associated with REPORT and CSR. We employ 
year- and firm-fixed effects to control for specific year and company effects on the 
dependent variables. 
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2.5. RESULTS 
 
2.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4 displays the mean and median values, the standard deviation and the 10th and 
90th percentiles. 
 
Table 4 
Main Descriptive Statistics 
Mean, median, standard deviation, and percentiles of the main variables. Panel A and B show the 
continuous and dummy variables, respectively. REPORT equals 1 if the firm discloses CSR report and 0, 
otherwise; CSR is the CSR index; PINST is the proportion of institutional directors on board;PSENSIT is 
the proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors; 
PRESIST is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-resistant institutional 
investors; FSIZE is the logarithm of total assets; ROA is the operate income before interests and taxes 
over total assets; LEV is volume of firm’s short and long term debt over its total assets. BDSIZE is the 
number of directors on board; INDP is the proportion of independent directors on board; BDMEET is the 
number meetings held by the board in a year; CEO_DUALITY equals to 1 if CEO and president of the 
board are the same person and 0, otherwise; SECT_OE equals to 1 if the firm belongs to the oil and 
energy sector and 0, othersiwise; SECT_IC equals 1 if the firm belongs to the basic materials, industry 
and construction sector and 0, otherwise; SECT_CO equals 1 if the firm belongs to the consumer services 
sector and 0, otherwise. 
 
Panel A. Continuos variables 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Perc. 10 Perc. 90 
CSR 864 0.311 0.000 0.359 0.000 84.000% 
PINST 864 45.031% 45.455% 28.407% 11.111% 75.000% 
PSENSIT 864 7.720% 0.000% 13.909% 0.000% 26.667% 
PRESIST 864 36.889% 33.333% 26.751% 0.000% 71.429% 
FSIZE 864 13.048 13.057 2.098 10.608 15.683 
ROA 864 -1.315% 1.649% 56.101% -16.208% 14.639% 
LEV 864 57.557% 54.294% 46.899% 11.059% 91.51% 
BDSIZE 864 10.263 10.000 3.914 5.000 16.000 
BDMEET 864 9.700 10.000 4.002 5.000 14.000 
INDP 864 33.186% 33.333% 18.379% 11.111% 60.000% 
 
Panel B. Dummies variables 
Variable 0 % (0) 1 % (1) 
REPORT 454 52.546% 410 47.454% 
CEO_DUALITY 587 67.940% 277 32.060% 
SECT_OE 797 92.245% 67 7.755% 
SECT_IC 635 73.495% 229 26.505% 
SECT_CO 757 87.616% 107 12.384% 
 
 
The results show that the 47.5% of the firms provide CSR reports using the GRI 
framework, while the value of CSR is 0.31, demonstrating that the CSR disclosure of 
firms is moderate. Regarding economic data, on average, firms present a size of 13.05 
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(log. of total assets), negative profitability (-1.31%) and debt of 57.56%. The board of 
directors, on average, consists of 10 members; independent directors represent 33.19% 
and institutional directors account for 45.03%. The percentages of pressure-sensitive 
and pressure-resistant directors are 7.72% and 36.89%, respectively. The board meets, 
on average, 9.7 times per year. Moreover, the same person holds the position of CEO 
and board president in 32% of companies. Finally, 7.74% of firms belong to the oil and 
energy sector, 26.52% of firms are in the basic materials, industry and construction 
sector and 12.34% operate in the consumer services sector. 
 
2.5.2. Univariate analysis 
 
Table 5 shows the analysis of the mean differences run for the independent variables. 
Two groups were constructed to analyse the mean differences among the independent 
variables, according to whether the firms disclose GRI reports and whether they provide 
CSR information higher or equal than the CSR median. For the REPORT variable, 
firms that do not provide GRI reports were included in the first group and other firms 
were included in the second group. For the CSR variable, the median was selected as 
the critical value for making up the two groups (0.00). Thus, in the first group, firms 
with a CSR value equal the CSR median were included, whereas other companies were 
included in the second group (firms with a CSR value higher than the CSR median).  
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Table 5 
Means comparison test 
REPORT equals 1 if the firm discloses CSR report and 0, otherwise; CSR is the CSR index; PINST is the 
proportion of institutional directors on board; PSENSIT is the proportion of the board directors who are 
representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors; PRESIST is the proportion of the board 
directors who are representative of pressure-resistant institutional investors. 
 
 
Panel A. Analysis of mean differences when the dependent variables is REPORT 
 
 
 
Panel B. Analysis of mean differences when the dependent variables is CSR 
 
 
 
As can be seen, the results show that the mean differences for institutional directors 
(PINST) and pressure-resistant directors (PRESIST) are negative and statistically 
significant for both dependent variables: REPORT and CSR. Therefore, these findings 
suggest that the percentage of institutional and pressure-resistant directors is lower on 
boards in firms using GRI reports and disclosing CSR information below the median 
value. These results are in line with Arora and Dhawadkar (2011), Coffey and Fryxell 
(1991) and Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca (2016), who also find such a 
relationship and provide evidence in favour of the collusion hypothesis, namely, that 
these directors prefer to collude with managers to attain private benefits, such as 
reinforcing their position, rather than controlling the management team and promoting 
CSR activities. Hence, a passive monitoring role is displayed by institutional and 
pressure-resistant directors (Varma, 2001). 
 
On the other hand, the results also indicate that pressure-sensitive directors positively 
influence CSR disclosure. This finding demonstrates a positive relationship between 
Variable REPORT (=0) Mean 
REPORT (=1) 
Mean 
Mean 
difference 
 
p-value 
PINST 47.526 42.277 5.249 0.016 
PSENSIT 5.802 9.837 -4.035 0.000 
PRESIST 40.853 32.510 8.343 0.000 
Variable CSR (= 0) Mean 
CSR (>0) 
Mean 
Mean 
difference 
 
p-value 
PINST 47.526 42.277 5.249 0.016 
PSENSIT 5.802 9.837 -4.045 0.000 
PRESIST 40.853 32.510 8.343 0.000 
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pressure-sensitive directors and REPORT and CSR; that is, a higher proportion of 
pressure-sensitive directors on boards encourages firms to provide GRI reports and 
disclose CSR information. Consistent with these views, Khan et al. (2009), Pucheta-
Martínez and García-Meca (2016) and Sharif and Rashid (2014) also show that 
pressure-sensitive directors have a positive impact on CSR reporting. The findings 
suggest that pressure-sensitive directors play an active and effective monitoring role, 
promoting CSR activities. Accordingly, they may take into account stakeholders’ 
interests through CSR activities. 
 
2.5.3. Multivariate analysis 
 
To examine the potential for multicollinearity problems, Spearman’s correlation 
matrix was calculated. The values, provided in Table 6, show that the correlation 
coefficients are not high enough (> 0.8) to trigger multicollinearity issues 
(Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001; Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes, 2008), except for 
the pair PINST–PRESIST, which has a value of 0.825. However, these variables are not 
simultaneously incorporated in the model. Accordingly, the models employed do not 
exhibit multicollinearity problems and, therefore the results are not biased by 
multicollinearity.
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Table 6 
Correlation Matrix 
Spearman’s correlation matrix. REPORT equals 1 if the firm discloses CSR report and 0, otherwise; CSR is the CSR index; PINST is the proportion of institutional directors 
on board;PSENSIT is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors; PRESIST is the proportion of the board 
directors who are representative of pressure-resistant institutional investors; FSIZE is the logarithm of total assets; ROA is the operate income before interests and taxes over 
total assets; LEV is volume of firm’s short and long term debt over its total assets. BDSIZE is the number of directors on board; INDP is the proportion of independent 
directors on board; BDMEET is the number meetings held by the board in a year; CEO_DUALITY equals to 1 if CEO and president of the board are the same person and 0, 
otherwise; SECT_OE equals to 1 if the firm belongs to the oil and energy sector and 0, othersiwise; SECT_IC equals 1 if the firm belongs to the basic materials, industry and 
construction sector and 0, otherwise; SECT_CO equals 1 if the firm belongs to the consumer services sector and 0, otherwise. * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
REPORT CSR PINST PSENSIT PRESIST BDMEET LEV ROA FSIZE CEO_DUALITY INDP BDSIZE SECT_OE SECT_IC SECT_CO 
REPORT 1               
CSR 0.935*** 1              
PINST -0.081* -0.102*** 1             
PSENSIT 0.175*** 0.195*** 0.198*** 1            
PRESIST -0.147*** -0.169*** 0.825*** -0.278*** 1           
BDMEET 0.108** 0.154*** 0.121** -0.004 0.103** 1          
LEV 0.056 0.070 0.041 -0.110*** 0.087** 0.180*** 1         
ROA 0.308*** 0.273*** -0.135*** -0.022 -0.104** -0.085** -0.310*** 1        
FSIZE 0.590*** 0.673*** -0.042 0.198*** -0.124** 0.287* 0.288*** 0.134*** 1       
CEO_DUALITY -0.029 0.002 -0.315*** -0.101** -0.262*** 0.030 0.031 0.017 0.146 1      
INDP 0.200*** 0.244*** -0.691*** +0.188*** -0.533*** 0.037 -0.125** 0.105* 0.124** 0.169*** 1     
BDSIZE 0.563*** 0.571*** 0.198*** 0.344*** 0.051 0.227*** 0.105** 0.114*** 0.670*** -0.117*** -0.016 1    
SECT_OE 0.138*** 0.258*** -0.054 -0.054 -0.053 0.200*** -0.128*** 0.066 0.256*** -0.007 0.215*** 0.126*** 1   
SECT_IC 0.096** 0.068 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.187*** 0.087** 0.149*** -0.035 0.044 0.079* -0.128*** 0.080* -0.173*** 1  
SECT_CO 0.102** 0.124*** 0.012 0.012*** 0.036 -0.062 0.139*** -0.050 0.075* 0.042 -0.049 0.143*** -0.108** -0.225*** 1 
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Tables 7 and 8 display the findings of the baseline model for institutional, pressure-
sensitive and pressure-resistant directors. In Table 7, we provide the results for the 
dependent variable REPORT, using model 1 for institutional directors, model 2 for 
pressure-sensitive and model 3 for pressure-resistant directors. In Table 8, we report the 
findings for the dependent variable CSR, following the same pattern used for the 
REPORT dependent variable, but employing models 4, 5 and 6, respectively, for 
institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant directors.  
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Table 7 
Results of the regression for institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant 
directors sit on the board when the dependent variable is REPORT  
Estimated coefficients. REPORT equals 1 if the firm discloses CSR report and 0, otherwise; PINST is the 
proportion of institutional directors on board;PSENSIT is the proportion of the board directors who are 
representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors; PRESIST is the proportion of the board 
directors who are representative of pressure-resistant institutional investors; FSIZE is the logarithm of 
total assets; ROA is the operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is volume of 
firm’s short and long term debt over its total assets. BDSIZE is the number of directors on board; INDP is 
the proportion of independent directors on board; BDMEET is the number meetings held by the board in 
a year; CEO_DUALITY equals to 1 if CEO and president of the board are the same person and 0, 
otherwise; SECT_OE equals to 1 if the firm belongs to the oil and energy sector and 0, othersiwise; 
SECT_IC equals 1 if the firm belongs to the basic materials, industry and construction sector and 0, 
otherwise; SECT_CO equals 1 if the firm belongs to the consumer services sector and 0, otherwise. * 
p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Variables Expected Sign 
Model 1 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Model 2 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Model 3 
Estimated 
coefficient 
PINST - -0.721
*** 
(0.000)   
PINST2 + 0.205
*** 
(0.000)   
PSENSIT +  0.149 (0.655)  
PSENSIT2 -  -0.650 (0.265)  
PRESIST -   -0.587
*** 
(0.000) 
PRESIST2 +   0.195
*** 
(0.000) 
BDMEET + -0.011
** 
(0.014) 
-0.017*** 
(0.000) 
-0.012*** 
(0.005) 
LEV - -0.052 (0.108) 
-0.040 
(0.261) 
-0.035 
(0.308) 
ROA + 0.046 (0176) 
0.044 
(0.213) 
0.050 
(0.155) 
FSIZE + 0.028
*** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.722) 
0.020** 
(0.022) 
CEO_DUALITY - -0.117
*** 
(0.002) 
-0.060 
(0.102) 
-0.102*** 
(0.006) 
INDP + 0.002 (0.989) 
0.415*** 
(0.000) 
0.151 
(0.196) 
BDSIZE + 0.049
*** 
(0.000) 
0.046*** 
(0.000) 
0.044*** 
(0.000) 
SECT_OE 
+ 
0.150** 
(0.010) 
0.179*** 
(0.008) 
0.167*** 
(0.006) 
SECT_IC 
+ 
0.165*** 
(0.000) 
0.141*** 
(0.003) 
0.180*** 
(0.000) 
SECT_CO 
+ 
0.133** 
(0.011) 
0.122* 
(0.033) 
 
0.151*** 
(0.007) 
Observations 
R2 
 864 
66.08% 
864 
63.87% 
864 
65.79% 
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Table 8 
Results of the regression for institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant 
directors sit on the board when the dependent variable is CSR 
 
Estimated coefficients. CSR is the CSR index; PINST is the proportion of institutional directors on 
board;PSENSIT is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors; PRESIST is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of 
pressure-resistant institutional investors; FSIZE is the logarithm of total assets; ROA is the operate 
income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is volume of firm’s short and long term debt over 
its total assets. BDSIZE is the number of directors on board; INDP is the proportion of independent 
directors on board; BDMEET is the number meetings held by the board in a year; CEO_DUALITY 
equals to 1 if CEO and president of the board are the same person and 0, otherwise; SECT_OE equals to 1 
if the firm belongs to the oil and energy sector and 0, othersiwise; SECT_IC equals 1 if the firm belongs 
to the basic materials, industry and construction sector and 0, otherwise; SECT_CO equals 1 if the firm 
belongs to the consumer services sector and 0, otherwise. * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Variables Expected Sign 
Model 4 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Model 5 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Model 6 
Estimated 
coefficient 
PINST - -0.602
*** 
(0.000)   
PINST2 + 0.177
*** 
(0.000)   
PSENSIT +  0.111 (0.631)  
PSENSIT2 -  -0.622 (0.125)  
PRESIST -   -0.529
*** 
(0.000) 
PRESIST2 +   0.193
*** 
(0.000) 
BDMEET + -0.007
** 
(0.029) 
-0.122*** 
(0.000) 
-0.008** 
(0.012) 
LEV - -0.028 (0.196) 
-0.017 
(0.469) 
-0.127 
(0.580) 
ROA + 0.030 (0.121) 
0.029 
(0.160) 
0.033* 
(0.098) 
FSIZE + 0.017
*** 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.408) 
0.101* 
(0.056) 
CEO_DUALITY - -0.063
** 
(0.018) 
-0.157 
(0.541) 
-0.527* 
(0.048) 
INDP + -0.055 (0.497) 
0.294*** 
(0.000) 
0.061 
(0.41) 
BDSIZE + 0.037
*** 
(0.000) 
0.034*** 
(0.000) 
0.033*** 
(0.000) 
SECT_OE 
+ 
0.270*** 
(0.000) 
0.296*** 
(0.000) 
0.284*** 
(0.000) 
SECT_IC 
+ 
0.111*** 
(0.000) 
0.093*** 
(0.003) 
0.125*** 
(0.000) 
SECT_CO 
+ 
0.136*** 
(0.001) 
0.130*** 
(0.003) 
0.153*** 
(0.000) 
Observations 
R2 
 864 
66.64% 
864 
63.61% 
864 
66.58% 
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According to model 1 in Table 7 (REPORT as the dependent variable) and model 4 
in Table 8 (CSR as the dependent variable), the variables PINST and PINST2 show that 
the presence of institutional directors on boards presents the expected signs (negative 
and positive, respectively) in a linear and quadratic way and the values are statistically 
significant in both models. Therefore, H1 cannot be rejected. The results show that as 
the number of institutional directors on boards increases, there will be a negative effect 
on CSR reporting, but when they reach a turning point, this situation will be inverted 
and the addition of new institutional members on boards beyond this tipping point will 
positively affect CSR disclosure. Accordingly, two opposite roles may be performed by 
institutional directors. When their presence on boards is low, the collusion hypothesis 
predominates and they prefer to support executives’ decisions, such as reducing CSR 
reporting, but at a high level, above a critical point, the monitoring hypothesis prevails 
and they challenge the executive team to undertake CSR reporting. These results are in 
line with previous research demonstrating these two opposite roles (e.g. Jara-Bertín et 
al., 2012; Navissi and Naiker, 2006; Zou, 2010). Therefore, there is evidence of a U-
shaped relationship between institutional directors and CSR disclosure, consistent with 
Hu and Izumida (2008), who find this relationship between dominant shareholders 
(such as institutional investors) and corporate performance as CSR is essential to create 
organizational value (Mahapatra, 1984). 
 
Regarding pressure-sensitive directors, both the PSENSIT and PSENSIT2 variables 
exhibit the expected signs in Table 7 for the REPORT dependent variable (model 2) and 
in Table 8 for the CSR dependent variable (model 5), but the results are not statically 
significant in either model. Consequently, H2b, contrary our expectations, has to be 
rejected. Hence, the presence of pressure-sensitive directors on boards does not 
influence CSR disclosure. These findings are consistent with previous research showing 
that pressure-sensitive directors do not affect CSR (e.g. Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Oh et al., 2011). This result could be due to the lack of 
interest of pressure-sensitive directors in strategic issues such as CSR as controlling 
CSR practices is a long-term activity (Johnson and Greening, 1999) and they might 
prefer to be involved in activities that increase short-term earnings (Hoskisson et al., 
2002). In addition – and given that they represent institutional investors who maintain 
commercial ties with the firm in which they hold a directorship on boards – they may 
 98 
prefer to obtain private benefits by supporting other executives’ decisions rather than 
strategic decisions, such as CSR disclosure or practices. 
 
The variables PRESIST and PRESIST2 also present the expected signs (negative and 
positive respectively) in model 3, reported in Table 7, for the REPORT dependent 
variable and in model 6, in Table 8, for the CSR dependent variable; these are 
statistically significant in both models. Therefore, H2a cannot be rejected. These 
findings display a U-shaped association between the presence of pressure-resistant 
directors on boards and CSR reporting. In particular, these findings show that pressure-
resistant directors collude with executive teams (collusion hypothesis) when their 
presence on boards is low and they may support their decisions, for example lowering 
CSR initiatives. However, when they reach a certain point in terms of increased 
presence, they perform a monitoring role more effectively, mitigating the potential for 
other pressure-resistant directors to take part in tunnelling activities (contest hypothesis) 
and challenging boards and managers to engage in CSR activities as these are essential 
to boost company performance. These results are in line with Jiao and Ye (2013), who 
also argue that these two opposite roles are played by pressure-resistant directors in 
analysing the association between pressure-resistant directors and company value.  
 
Regarding the control variables, the three variables that represent the sector 
(SECT_OE, SECT_IC and SECT_CO) exhibit the expected signs (positive) in all 
models and they are statistically significant. These findings suggest that firms operating 
in highly sensitive sectors disclose more CSR information. BDSIZE is also statistically 
significant and has a positive impact on CSR, as expected, demonstrating that larger 
boards support CSR reporting. BDMEET is statistically significant, but contrary to our 
expectations, the number of meetings held by the board has a negative effect on CSR 
reporting. The variables ROA and LEV behave in all models in the same way. These 
variables exhibit the expected signs (positive and negative, respectively), but they are 
not statistically significant, except for the variable ROA for pressure-resistant directors 
in model 6 in Table 8. These findings show that these two variables do not influence 
CSR disclosure, in line with Cuadrado-Balleteros at al., (2015), Frias-Aceituno et al. 
(2013) and Oh et al. (2011). The findings obtained for the other control variables should 
be considered with caution as FSIZE, CEO_DUALITY and INDP do not behave in the 
same way in all models. FSIZE influences CSR disclosure positively and it is 
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statistically significant in models 1, 3, 4 and 6, but not in models 2 and 5. 
CEO_DUALITY exhibits the expected sign (negative) and is statistically significant, 
except in models 2 and 5. Finally, the variable INDP does not have an effect on CSR 
reporting (models 1, 3, 4 and 6), but the proportion of independent directors on boards 
has a positive effect on CSR activities when the presence of pressure-sensitive directors 
is considered (models 2 and 5). 
 
Finally, we also take into account potential endogeneity problems between 
institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant directors and CSR disclosure as 
they may emerge in studies such as this (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Namely, we 
wonder if these directors have a positive/negative effect on CSR reporting, or if firms 
with CSR reporting attract institutional, pressure-sensitive, or pressure-resistant 
directors to their boards. Causality usually goes from these directors to CSR disclosure, 
but it is also possible that CSR disclosure may affect board structure. Accordingly, we 
address this matter by lagging our independent and explanatory variables in our 
regressions in line with Hartzell and Sarks (2003) and Ozkan (2007), who support the 
use of lagged explanatory variables to alleviate possible endogeneity concerns. The 
findings are provided in Table 9 with REPORT as the dependent variable and Table 10 
with CSR as the dependent variable. In Tables 9 and 10, the roles of institutional 
directors’ performance are analysed in models 1 and 4, respectively, those of pressure-
sensitive directors in models 2 and 5 and those of pressure-resistant directors in models 
3 and 6. As can be observed, the results shown in Tables 9 and 10 are consistent with 
the core findings provided earlier and, thus, we can confirm that potential endogeneity 
is not a concern in our analysis. The results with lagged explanatory variables confirm 
the findings previously shown.  
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Table 9 
Estimates of the baseline models for institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-
resistant institutional directors sit on the board when the dependent variable is 
REPORT (Lagging independent variables) 
 
Estimated coefficients. REPORT equals 1 if the firm discloses CSR report and 0, otherwise; PINST is the 
proportion of institutional directors on board;PSENSIT is the proportion of the board directors who are 
representative of pressure-sensitive institutional investors; PRESIST is the proportion of the board 
directors who are representative of pressure-resistant institutional investors; FSIZE is the logarithm of 
total assets; ROA is the operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is volume of 
firm’s short and long term debt over its total assets. BDSIZE is the number of directors on board; INDP is 
the proportion of independent directors on board; BDMEET is the number meetings held by the board in 
a year; CEO_DUALITY equals to 1 if CEO and president of the board are the same person and 0, 
otherwise; SECT_OE equals to 1 if the firm belongs to the oil and energy sector and 0, othersiwise; 
SECT_IC equals 1 if the firm belongs to the basic materials, industry and construction sector and 0, 
otherwise; SECT_CO equals 1 if the firm belongs to the consumer services sector and 0, otherwise.  
* p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Variables Expected Sign 
Model 1 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Model 2 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Model 3 
Estimated 
coefficient 
PINST_1 - 
-0.733*** 
(0.000)   
PINST2_1 + 
0.240*** 
(0.003)   
PSENSIT_1 +  
0.045 
(0.902)  
PSENSIT2_1 -  
-0.449 
(0.495)  
PRESIST_1 -   
-0.602*** 
(0.000) 
PRESIST2_1 +   
0.157*** 
(0.003) 
BDMEET + -0.012
** 
(0.014) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
-0.012** 
(0.010) 
LEV - -0.044 (0.178) 
-0.051 
(0.165) 
-0.031 
(0.346) 
ROA + 0.043 (0.151) 
0.032 
(0.306) 
0.047 
(0.123) 
FSIZE + 0.028
*** 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.680) 
0.021** 
(0.032) 
CEO_DUALITY - -0.152
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.075* 
(0.081) 
-0.134*** 
(0.002) 
INDP + 0.911 (0.497) 
0.419*** 
(0.000) 
0.183 
(0.147) 
BDSIZE + 0.048
*** 
(0.000) 
0.046*** 
(0.000) 
0.045*** 
(0.000) 
SECT_OE 
+ 
0.138** 
(0.036) 
0.176** 
(0.018) 
0.161** 
(0.017) 
SECT_IC 
+ 
0.184*** 
(0.001) 
0.159*** 
(0.003) 
0.207*** 
(0.000) 
SECT_CO 
+ 
0.131** 
(0.026) 
0.121* 
(0.058) 
0.153** 
(0.014) 
Observations 
R2 
 655 
68.26% 
655 
65.86% 
655 
68.24% 
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Table 10 
Estimates of the baseline models for institutional, pressure-sensitive, pressure-
resistant and female institutional directors sit on the board when the dependent 
variable is CSR (Lagging independent variables) 
 
Estimated coefficients. CSR is the CSR index; PINST is the proportion of institutional directors on 
board;PSENSIT is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors; PRESIST is the proportion of the board directors who are representative of 
pressure-resistant institutional investors; FSIZE is the logarithm of total assets; ROA is the operate 
income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is volume of firm’s short and long term debt over 
its total assets. BDSIZE is the number of directors on board; INDP is the proportion of independent 
directors on board; BDMEET is the number meetings held by the board in a year; CEO_DUALITY 
equals to 1 if CEO and president of the board are the same person and 0, otherwise; SECT_OE equals to 1 
if the firm belongs to the oil and energy sector and 0, othersiwise; SECT_IC equals 1 if the firm belongs 
to the basic materials, industry and construction sector and 0, otherwise; SECT_CO equals 1 if the firm 
belongs to the consumer services sector and 0, otherwise. * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Variables Expected Sign 
Model 4 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Model 5 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Model 6 
Estimated 
coefficient 
PINST_1 - 
-0.607*** 
(0.000)   
PINST2_1 + 
0.197*** 
(0.000)   
PSENSIT_1 +  
-0.093 
(0.719)  
PSENSIT2_1 -  
0.583 
(0.225)  
PRESIST_1 -   
-0.540*** 
(0.000) 
PRESIST2_1 +   
0.168*** 
(0.000) 
BDMEET + -0.008
** 
(0.014) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009** 
(0.010) 
LEV - -0.017 (0.441) 
-0.021 
(0.379) 
-0.003 
(0.883) 
ROA + 0.030
* 
(0.072) 
0.021 
(0.224) 
0.034** 
(0.040) 
FSIZE + 0.017
** 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.592) 
0.011* 
(0.073) 
CEO_DUALITY - -0.083
** 
(0.010) 
-0.019 
(0.000) 
-0.071** 
(0.026) 
INDP + 0.015 (0.867) 
0.292*** 
(0.000) 
0.091 
(0.272) 
BDSIZE + 0.037
*** 
(0.000) 
0.036*** 
(0.000) 
0.034*** 
(0.000) 
SECT_OE 
+ 
0.264*** 
(0.000) 
0.299*** 
(0.000) 
0.283*** 
(0.000) 
SECT_IC 
+ 
0.125*** 
(0.001) 
0.105*** 
(0.004) 
0.145*** 
(0.000) 
SECT_CO 
+ 
0.139*** 
(0.002) 
0.132*** 
(0.007) 
0.159*** 
(0.001) 
Observations 
R2 
 655 
68.76% 
655 
65.67% 
655 
69.10% 
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2.6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Given the great importance that CSR is acquiring as a strategic element, boards of 
directors are increasingly considering CSR issues. Thus, the aim of this research is to 
explore whether directors who represent institutional investors have an effect on CSR 
reporting. The existing literature has scarcely considered the role of these board 
members in relation to corporate governance; nonetheless, understanding institutional 
directors’ behaviour regarding CSR practices is essential as they are the most important 
controlling shareholders in Europe and corporate governance is a key issue in 
developing CSR. Consequently, we not only examine the repercussions of the presence 
of institutional directors as a whole for CSR, but also distinguish between pressure-
resistant directors, who are appointed by institutional investors with an investment tie 
with the firm, and pressure-sensitive directors, who are appointed by institutional 
investors with a commercial and investment relationship with the firm, as not all 
institutional investors do not behave in the same way on corporate matters and 
commercial ties are a key factor that may affect their behaviour.  
 
The results show the influence that institutional investors exert when they are board 
members. Specifically, we demonstrate that when the presence of institutional directors 
on boards is low, they have a negative influence on CSR reporting, but when their 
participation reaches a critical point, the addition of more institutional directors on 
boards will positively affect CSR disclosure. Thus, unlike previous research that shows 
a linear relationship, our paper shows a U-shaped association between institutional 
directors and CSR practices, suggesting that these directors may play two opposite roles 
(collusion or monitoring), depending on their level of representation on boards. Indeed, 
when the proportion of institutional directors on boards is low, they prefer to collude 
with managers, who perceive CSR as an extra cost, in order to obtain private benefits 
rather than undertaking monitoring activities to promote CSR activities. Most board 
members do not consider CSR an essential matter and, therefore, if institutional 
directors were to undertake monitoring activities and challenge board members to 
engage in CSR activities, they would have to bear higher costs to implement these 
activities. Consequently, as institutional directorship increases, these directors might 
prefer to support the executive teams in attaining their own goals instead of incurring 
greater costs for carrying out CSR activities. Nevertheless, adding more institutional 
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directors on boards beyond a tipping point will positively affect CSR reporting, perhaps 
because they may share the costs of inducing board members and management teams to 
foster CSR practices. Furthermore, as the presence of institutional directors on boards 
exceeds this critical point, the other directors may take into account the institutional 
directors’ preferences, for example for CSR activities, given the benefits that such 
activities can bring. Therefore, a proportion of institutional directors above a certain 
threshold results in them playing more effective and active roles, allowing better control 
of managers and other institutional directors to militate against them engaging in 
tunnelling activities and failing to support CSR reporting. This conclusion is in line with 
the idea that when the presence of certain directors (in our case institutional directors) 
reaches a critical mass on boards, it is likely to affect the behaviour of the board and it is 
more probable that the company will behave in a socially responsible way (Landry et 
al., 2014). 
 
On the other hand, this research shows that institutional directors do not share the 
same incentives to engage in corporate governance. According to our findings, 
institutional directors should be treated as a heterogeneous group as their attitudes with 
respect to CSR disclosure are not uniform. In particular, pressure-sensitive directors do 
not affect CSR reporting and do not take part in CSR matters, probably because, given 
their short-term orientation, they are not interested in influencing corporate strategy in 
relation to CSR as the benefits of these strategies are derived over the long term. 
Moreover, the business links that pressure-sensitive investors maintain with the firm in 
which they invest will determine their level of support for managers. Thus, such 
directors will align with managers in order to guarantee their commercial relations. 
Consequently, pressure-sensitive directors will be less likely to promote CSR 
disclosure. The complexity and uncertainty of CSR practices may also explain the lack 
of engagement of pressure-sensitive directors in these activities; they will be more 
inclined to focus on others matters involving less effort and cost, and more in line with 
the aims of the managers. 
 
In contrast, pressure-resistant directors influence CSR reporting. Consistent with 
institutional directors as a whole, pressure-resistant directors negatively affect CSR 
disclosure. However, beyond a critical point, more pressure-resistant directors on boards 
will have positive repercussions for CSR reporting, suggesting a U-shaped relationship 
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between pressure-resistant directors and CSR practices. These findings show that 
pressure-resistant directors engage in collusion when their presence on boards is low, 
probably because they prefer to support managers’ decisions to implement tunnelling 
activities and attain their own goals. They may choose not to support the 
implementation of CSR activities given that the costs of challenging executives and 
other directors on boards to undertake such activities may be greater than the benefits. 
However, when their presence reaches a certain tipping point, pressure-resistant 
directors will display a monitoring role as a higher presence of these directors on boards 
will allow them to share the monitoring costs and control will become more efficient. 
Thus, it will be more likely that pressure-resistant directors encourage changes related 
to CSR practices and the behaviour of firms will be more responsible, resulting in them 
gaining the benefits of carrying out such practices. This conclusion is in line with the 
view that pressure-resistant directors are probably keener to engage with complex and 
uncertain issues, such as defining corporate strategies (García-Meca et al., 2013) related 
to CSR disclosure, rather than aligning with managers.  
 
The presence of institutional directors in Anglo-Saxon countries is less frequent than 
in civil law contexts. Therefore, the findings obtained in this research have significant 
and interesting implications both in the political and academic arenas. The 
representation of independent directors on boards is recommended to improve corporate 
governance, but policymakers should also consider the ownership structure when they 
suggest board composition, particularly the presence of directors appointed by 
institutional investors, as they influence corporate governance, especially concerning 
CSR policies. Institutional directors, as supported by the previous literature, do not 
behave in the same way and can be classified as pressure-resistant and pressure-
sensitive directors. Thus, the types of institutional directors on boards should be 
considered when policymakers make suggestions regarding board structure, given that 
pressure-resistant directors affect CSR reporting, whereas pressure-sensitive directors 
do not. Another point to be emphasized is the contrasting roles that institutional 
directors and pressure-resistant directors can play, namely, monitoring and collusion, 
depending on the proportion of these directors on boards. Policymakers should take this 
into account as these directors can damage corporate governance if their presence is 
low, reducing CSR reporting, but they will be more likely to disclose CSR information 
if their presence is higher than a critical point. Another implication of our analysis is 
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that pressure-sensitive directors do not have the incentives or capabilities to participate 
in and affect the strategic decisions of firms in relation to CSR. Finally, pressure-
sensitive directors do not consider the stakeholders’ interests in firms, in contrast to 
pressure-resistant directors who take into account such interests when their presence on 
boards exceeds a tipping point. Hence, there is a need for more research focused on 
institutional directors taking part in corporate governance mechanisms, such as boards 
of directors, especially in countries where their presence as directors is significant, as 
new insights into the reasons for their participation in corporate governance and their 
implications are essential. This is particularly the case given the two opposite roles 
(monitoring and collusion) that they can play and the fact that their incentives can be 
different (pressure-resistant/pressure-sensitive).  
 
Some limitations should be considered. The data used in this research were obtained 
from a population of Spanish listed firms for the period 2007–2014. Thus, the findings 
may not be applicable to other periods. Apart from institutional directors, other factors 
that may influence CSR have been taken into account. These were chosen based on 
theory and prior evidence, but it may be possible that other unknown aspects might 
affect CSR reporting.  
 
This research could lead to future investigations. The TBL framework includes three 
components: social, environmental and financial information. It would be interesting to 
explore how institutional directors affect these three pillars separately, rather than 
considering them as a whole. Small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) play an 
essential role in the Spanish economy and, thus, an analysis of how corporate 
governance in these companies affects CSR reporting merits attention, particularly as 
CSR can be a source of competitive advantage for firms and the responsible behaviour 
of firms may be affected by corporate governance. 
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CONCLUSIÓN 
 
 
Entre los grandes accionistas, los inversores institucionales han adquirido una gran 
importancia en la participación de la gestión de las empresas. Este papel activo en el 
gobierno de las empresas les ha hecho que se les considere como el mecanismo más 
eficaz para intervenir en el gobierno corporativo de las empresas (Wilcox, 2001). 
Mientras la gran mayoría de la literatura existente se centra en la influencia de estos 
inversores como accionistas, poca ha sido la atención recibida cuando estos inversores 
participan en el consejo de administración de las empresas como consejeros. Así pues, 
el objetivo de este trabajo ha sido analizar el papel de los consejeros dominicales en el 
gobierno corporativo de las empresas cotizadas españolas. Para ello, hemos examinado 
cómo los consejeros dominicales influyen en la remuneración del CEO y sobre la 
divulgación de la RSC. 
 
Los resultados obtenidos demuestran que la participación de los inversores 
institucionales como consejeros en el consejo de administración influye en las 
decisiones de gobierno corporativo de las compañías españolas. Respecto a la 
remuneración del CEO, observamos que los consejeros dominicales reducen la 
remuneración del primer ejecutivo. Sin embargo, cuando la presencia de los consejeros 
dominicales alcanza cierta representatividad (un porcentaje determinado) en el consejo 
de administración, la remuneración el CEO se incrementa. Esta evidencia pone de 
manifiesto que la asociación entre los consejeros dominicales y la remuneración del 
CEO es no lineal, concretamente cuadrática (en forma de U). En cuanto a la estructura 
del salario del CEO, los consejeros dominicales influyen positiva y negativamente sobre 
la retribución fija y variable, respectivamente. Cuando clasificamos a los consejeros 
dominicales en consejeros resistentes a la presión o en consejeros sensibles a la presión, 
evidenciamos que los directores resistentes a la presión se comportan de la misma forma 
que los inversores institucionales considerados como un todo. En cambio, los resultados 
también revelan que los consejeros sensibles a la presión no influyen en la 
remuneración del CEO. 
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En cuanto a la divulgación de la RSC, evidenciamos que cuando la presencia de los 
consejeros dominicales en el consejo de administración es baja, éstos influyen 
negativamente sobre la divulgación de información de RSC. Ahora bien, cuando la 
presencia de los consejeros dominicales en el consejo supera un porcentaje determinado, 
los consejeros dominicales apoyan la divulgación de información sobre RSC. Por otro 
lado, observamos que los consejeros resistentes a la presión se comportan de la misma 
forma que los consejeros dominicales en general, y que la divulgación de información 
sobre RSC no se ve afectada por la presencia de consejeros sensibles a la presión. Esta 
evidencia revela que la relación entre consejeros dominicales y la divulgación de 
información sobre RSC es no lineal, concretamente en forma de U. 
 
Este trabajo tiene importantes implicaciones académicas y para los reguladores y 
supervisores españoles. En primer lugar, los resultados obtenidos evidencian que los 
consejeros dominicales de las empresas cotizadas son un mecanismo que influye en el 
gobierno corporativo de las empresas. En este sentido, los reguladores deberían 
considerar la estructura accionarial de las empresas cuando hacen recomendaciones 
acerca de la composición del consejo de administración. En concreto, deberían 
considerar la presencia de consejeros dominicales. En segundo lugar, al clasificar los 
consejeros dominicales en consejeros resistentes y sensibles a la presión, hemos 
observado que el modo de participar en el gobierno corporativo de las empresas es 
diferente entre unos y otros. De este modo, los reguladores deberían tener en cuenta el 
tipo de consejero dominical cuando hagan sugerencias sobre la participación de los 
inversores institucionales en el consejo de administración. En tercer lugar, cabe destacar 
el doble papel que pueden desempeñar los consejeros dominicales y los consejeros 
dominicales resistentes a la presión. Según los resultados obtenidos, estos consejeros 
pueden desempeñar un rol de control y de atrincheramiento, lo que mejoraría y 
empeoraría el gobierno corporativo, respectivamente. Así pues, considerar el nivel de 
representatividad de los consejeros dominicales en el consejo de administración es 
importante, ya que una presencia demasiada alta o baja podría perjudicar el gobierno 
corporativo de la empresa. Por lo tanto, son necesarios más estudios que analicen el 
doble rol que pueden desempeñar los consejeros dominicales y sus implicaciones. Por 
último, señalar que los consejeros dominicales sensibles a la presión no influyen en el 
gobierno corporativo de las empresas españolas, probablemente porque no quieren 
 108 
poner en peligro las relaciones comerciales de los inversores institucionales que 
representan en los consejos de administración.  
 
A continuación sugerimos futuras líneas de investigación que podrían derivarse de 
este trabajo: 
 
- El papel de los consejeros dominicales en el gobierno corporativo de las 
empresas de mediano y pequeño tamaño. 
 
- Los resultados obtenidos evidencian que los consejeros dominicales pueden 
desempeñar dos roles opuestos (control y atrincheramiento), dependiendo de 
su nivel de representatividad en el consejo de administración. Por lo tanto, 
sería importante analizar si los consejeros dominicales ejercen estos roles 
sobre otras variables empresariales, como por ejemplo, la política de 
dividendos o el endeudamiento empresarial, entre otras. 
 
- El papel de los consejeros dominicales en la creación voluntaria de distintas 
comisiones. 
 
- El papel que los consejeros dominicales desempeñan en las distintas 
comisiones (comisión ejecutiva, comisión de auditoría, comisión de 
nombramientos o comisión de retribución, entre otras). 
 
- Estudiar cómo influyen los consejeros dominicales en la incorporación de 
criterios extra-financieros, tales como aspectos sociales y medioambientales, 
en la retribución del equipo directivo. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Among the large shareholders, institucional investors have acquired a great 
importante in the participation of the management of the companies. This active role in 
corporate governance has made them considered as the most effective mechanism to 
intervene in corporate governance of companies (Wilcox, 2001). While most of 
previous literature focuses on the influence of these investors as shareholders, little 
attention has been received by researchers when these investors participate on boards as 
directors. Thus, the aim of this research has been to analyze the role of institutional 
directors in the corporate governance of Spanish listed companies. To this end, we have 
examined how institutional directors affect CEO compensation and CSR disclosure. 
 
The results show that the participation of institutional investors as directors on board 
of directors impact on the corporate governance decisions of Spanish companies. 
Regarding the remuneration of CEO, we evidence that institutional directors reduce the 
CEO compensation. However, when the presence of insitutional directors reaches 
certain representativeness (a certain percentage) on boards, CEO pay increases. This 
evidence shows that the association between institutiona directors and CEO 
compensation in non-linear, specifically quadratic (U-shaped). Regarding the structure 
on the CEO’s salary, instituional directors influence positively and negatively on fixed 
and variable remuneration, respectively. When we classify institutional directors into 
pressure-resistant or pressure-sensitive directors, we evidence that pressure-resistant 
directors behave in the same way as institutional directors considered as a whole. On the 
other hand, the results also show that pressure-sensitive directors do not influence on 
CEO compensation. 
 
Regarding CSR disclosure, we display that when the presence of institutional 
directors on boards is low, they have a negative influence on the disclosure of CSR 
information. However, when their presence on bords exceeds a certain percentage, 
institutional directors support the disclosure of CSR information. Furthermore, we 
demonstrate that pressure-resistant directors behave in the same way as institutional 
directors in general, and that the disclosure of CSR information is not affected by the 
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presence of pressure-sensitive directors. This evidence reveals that the relationship 
between institutional directors and CSR disclosure is non-linear (a U-shaped). 
 
This research has important implicactions: for academics and for Spanish regulators 
and supervisors. First, our evidence finds that institutional directors of listed companies 
are a mechanism that impact on the corporate governance of companies. In this sense, 
regulators should consider the ownership structure of companies when they make 
recommendations about board composition. In particular, they should consider the 
presence of institutional directors. Second, by classifying institutional directors into 
pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive directors, we have observed that the way of 
participating in corpoarte governance of companies is different between them. 
Regulators should, therefore, take into account the kind of institutional director when 
they make suggestions about the participation of institutional investors on boards. 
Thirdly, it is worth noting the dual role of institutional directors and pressure-resistant 
directors. According to the findings, these directors can play a role of control and 
entrenchment, which would improve and worsen corporate governance, respectively. 
Thus, considering the level of representativeness of institutional directors on boards is 
important, since a too high or too low presence could harm corporate governance of the 
company. Therefore, more research is needed to analyse the double role played by 
institutional directors and their implications. Finally, it should be pointed out that 
pressure-sensitive directors do not affect corporate governance of Spanish companies, 
probably because they do not want to jeopardize the commercial relationships of 
institutional investors that they represent on boards.  
 
Next, we suggest future research that could derive from this analysis: 
 
- The role of institutional investors in corporate governance of small and medium-
sized companies. 
- The findings evidence that institutional directors can play two opposite roles 
(control and entrenchment), depending on their level of representativeness on 
boards. Therefore, it would be important to analyse whether institutional 
directors play these roles over other business variables, such as dividend policy 
or corporate indebtedness, among others. 
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- The role of institutional investors on the voluntary creation of different 
commissions. 
- The role that institutional directors play on several committees (executive 
committee, audit committee, appointments committee or remuneration 
committee, among others). 
- To examine how institutional directors impact on the incorporation of extra-
financial criteria, such as social and environmental aspects, in the management 
team compensation. 
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